Summary
Russia is regarded as a global power with the largest territory worldwide. The Russian Federation is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, making it a Pacific, Asian, Arctic, and European power. Moreover, the country is a leading nuclear-armed power, arms exported, oil and natural gas producer, and export and military spender. Due to this, Russia is classified as an upper middle income following its level of economic development. Russian politics happen under a framework based on a semi-presidential republic of Russia.
Constitutionalism and presidentialism are contrasting concepts relating to the rule of law and the government’s structure. Presidentialism is where the president has the authority to overthrow legislation and dismiss or appoint government officials. On the other hand, constitutionalism involves a system of government revolving around the rule of law and is based on preventing abuse of power. In a constitutional system, power is distributed to diverse branches, such as the judiciary, legislative, and executive, instead of being given to the president alone. As per the constitution of Russia, the president leads the state as well as a multi-party system having executive power exercised by the government. The prime minister heads the system and is appointed under the power of the president and accompanied by the parliament’s approval. Moreover, the legislative power is bestowed in the two houses of the state assembly of the country. On the other hand, the government and the president give several by-laws that are legally binding. Russia has faced changes in its domestic political system under the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev, and Vladimir Putin.
Boris Yeltsin
President Boris Yeltsin served the Russian Federation from 1991 to 1999. As much as Boris Yeltsin was a communist member for most of his life, he eventually began to believe in a free market and democratic reforms. Moreover, Boris Yeltsin took a vital role in delivering Russia from the Soviet Union using promises of a market economy and liberal democracy (Clark, 1998). However, he inherited the presidency when the country was in the harshest years of an economic recession (Brudny, 1997). Boris Yeltsin was able to win two presidential terms, one of which was when the country was still a Soviet Federation. However, even after successfully initiating a more open and freer society, Boris Yeltsin inherited flawed political institutions as well as economic hardships (Cale, 2010). The country was plagued by increasing crime and corruption, diminished influence on global events, and a violent war in the breakaway Chechnya republic.
By eliminating the Soviet Union, president Boris Yeltsin was able to privatize most of the major state’s assets, get rid of price controls, adopt market principles, and enable the ownership of private property. Due to these changes, commodities exchanges, stock exchanges, and private banks were able to come into existence (Brudny, 1997). However, these efforts only favored a few selected oligarchs while the rest of the citizens fell into poverty following the increased cost of living and the explosion of inflation. Additionally, Russia under President Boris Yeltsin faced problems with being an ex-superpower associated with dropping industrial output, lawlessness, corruption, and decreasing life expectancies.
Boris Yeltsin was able to do away with his Soviet Predecessors by particularly encouraging press freedom, supporting public criticism, and allowing western popular culture to invade the country. However, he agreed to reductions of nuclear arms and brought soldiers from the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe into the country. Yeltsin then disbanded the communist-led Soviet parliament in 1993 after evading impeachment proceedings and suggested elections towards a new legislature introducing a presidentialism system (Goodnow, 2013; Husky, 1995; Colton & Skach, 2005; Golosov, 2003). Furthermore, Boris Yeltsin dealt with the resulting standoff by directing tanks to shield the parliamentary building. In the following year, Yeltsin approved sending troops into the breakaway Chechnya republic, which led to a huge number of casualties, most of which were civilians (Brudny, 1997). The fighting was able to stop in 1996 but then started again in 1999, which led to an economic crisis in Russia.
From the first day Boris Yeltsin took over the Russian presidency, he made efforts to reconstruct the country from a planned economy to a more liberal one. He directed his efforts towards liberalizing imports and exports as well as prices which were supported by the parliament in his first years in office. The parliament was even able to sanction Yeltsin to start appointments toward the implementation of radical economic programs (Easter, 1997). Per the 1977 constitution, the political assembly of Russia, which was mainly composed of communist party members, had authority over everything in the country (Ismayil & Necefoglu, 2022). Despite the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), this constitution was still being used while the former communists continued the control in parliament. Following this, the reforms made by president Boris Yeltsin could not make any progress if they would in any way affect the former communists. Therefore, Yeltsin later attempted to increase his power and authority over every state institution to be able to implement his reforms which the parliament did not approve quickly.
Boris Yeltsin disagreed with the USSR as well as the Congress of People’s Deputies over the control of government policies, the government, and government property and banking. Despite claiming to back the president’s overall goals, the USSR speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov, presented opposition to Yeltsin’s policies. Throughout 1992, the USSR speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov, presented opposition to Yeltsin’s policies. The 7th Congress of The People’s Deputies was able to turn down president Boris-backed candidacy of Yegor Gaidar in December 1992 over the Russian prime minister position (Brown, 2000). Furthermore, the chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, suggested an agreement that included the parliament and Yeltsin choosing a new head of government which would be confirmed by the Soviet Union. A national referendum on the new constitution and the parliament was required to stop initiating constitutional amendments that pushed for change in the power balance between the executive and legislative branches. The implementation of the new constitution paved the way for a presidentialism system.
The parliament eventually decided to take back the powers it had bestowed to president Yeltsin in 1993, which intensified the conflict between him and the parliament. To solve this problem, the idea of using a referendum was put forward, which was conducted on 25 April 1993 (Ismayil & Necefoglu, 2022). The people were asked in the referendum if they were content with president Boris Yeltsin, whether they approved the suggested reforms, and if they wanted early parliamentary and presidential elections (Depoy, 1996). The results of the exercise indicated that 58.7% of the people were satisfied with the president, 53.1% agreed to the set policies, 67.2% wanted early parliamentary elections and 49.5% presidential elections (Ismayil & Necefoglu, 2022). With this outcome, the legitimacy of Yeltsin was reinforced in the people. Furthermore, the results depicted popular approval of Yeltsin and his policies among the Russians (Easter, 1997). Moreover, the results of the referendum allowed president Boris Yeltsin to increase his work in the constitution, but his policies continued to be blocked by the assembly.
Following this opposition, Yeltsin announced to have dismissed the parliament on 21 September 1993. However, this argument did not hold as the assembly claimed to have withdrawn Yeltsin from the presidency since he did not hold any power to dissolve the parliament as per the 1977 Constitution (Ismayil & Necefoglu, 2022). President Yeltsin’s rivals were able to garner over 600 impeachment votes but lacked 72 votes to satisfy the required number of two-thirds of the majority, which enhanced the constitutional crisis. As the legitimacy deliberations were being made, Yeltsin still had the loyalty of the army, which he used to bomb the parliament building and detain the members of the assembly. Consequently, on 12 December 1993, a draft constitution was formulated, giving birth to superpresidentialism and presented for a public vote (Seyaz, 2020; Hale, 2012; Fish, 1997). The draft was accepted with 58.4% votes and a turnout of 54.4% (Ismayil & Necefoglu, 2022). President Boris Yeltsin announced his resignation on 31 December 1999 and then asked for forgiveness for his past mistakes from the Russian citizens. After resigning, Yeltsin handed over control of the country to Vladimir Putin as his chosen successor, who awarded Boris immunity from prosecution (Colton & Skach, 2005). Boris Yeltsin died in April 2007 after a quiet retirement.
Dimitry Medvedev
Dmitry Medvedev was ushered into the presidency in 2008 after winning the Russian election. President Medvedev was considered to be more liberal compared to Vladimir Putin, his predecessor. Over his term in office, Dmitry Medvedev appointed Vladimir Putin as the prime minister. The main agenda of president Medvedev during his presidency was to implement a comprehensive modernization program. The program was expected to modernize Russian society and economy. Medvedev promised to usher the country into a more democratic nation by working under the rule of law and protecting human rights. Moreover, President Dmitry Medvedev looked to reduce Russia’s dependence on oil and gas. Furthermore, Medvedev signed a nuclear arms reduction treaty which helped Russia gain victory in the Russo-Georgian War and boosted its recovery following the Great Recession (Cale, 2010). Throughout his presidency, Medvedev was also able to initiate an anti-corruption campaign.
President Medvedev was in office for a single term and was then succeeded by Putin in 2012. Medvedev’s presidency was unique in Russian political history as, for the first time, the head of state was supported by a highly powerful prime minister, Vladimir Putin. This new system of leadership was then termed tandemocracy or government by tandem, which depicted the country as having a dual-headed executive (Cale, 2010). This ushered in a system that is part of semi-presidentialism, where the president and prime minister hold equal power and constitutionalism.
Medvedev made it clear at the beginning of his presidency that he was going to improve efforts to modernize the social, economic, and political aspects of the country. Medvedev moved to implement various social and economic policies that would help improve the living standards of the Russians, such as the Skolkovo Innovation Centre, which was aimed to promote high-technology industries. Moreover, President Dmitry Medvedev was able to initiate a new anti-corruption agency and helped increase education and healthcare spending, which would then improve the quality of life in the country. Furthermore, Medvedev sought to redesign the Russian legal system, including policies for law enforcement and judiciary agencies.
Even with achieving some successes in improving the country’s situation, Medvedev’s presidency was also accompanied by various criticisms and challenges. Some people disputed that the modernization efforts were not helpful enough as the country continued to experience a lack of economic and political freedom. Moreover, there were significant concerns surrounding the country’s political recession and corruption under time in office (Cale, 2010). Furthermore, others argued that Putin was able to retain absolute control over Russia while Medvedev was mainly leading just as a figurehead.
In 2008, the country was plagued with the impacts of the global financial crisis. Before this, the Russian Finance Minister, Alexei Kudrin, believed that the country was safe following its stable macroeconomic situation, together with the sizable reserve accrued over the years of growth. However, the economic setback led to a continued drop in the country’s GDP, proving to be the worst in Russian history. In response to this, the government moved to utilize more money to support troubled banks. Moreover, the government established a large-scale stimulus program that was able to provide funding support for struggling companies. With these efforts, the country’s economic situation was able to stabilize in 2009, but substantial growth started in 2010, improving Medvedev’s approval rating. President Dmitry Medvedev’s approval ratings increased significantly but then improved following improvements in the economy. The country’s economic crisis and the 2008 South Ossetia War helped delay the initiation of president Medvedev’s liberal program (Cale, 2010). This is due to the fact that Medvedev and the government had to concentrate on anti-crisis measures rather than implementing the reforms.
The state of the economy can act as a vital factor that influences how people vote or support a government. For this reason, President Medvedev sought to implement the modernization program in the economic scope. The program helped reduce the country’s reliance on gas and oil revenues and helped develop a diversified economy characterized by high innovation and technology (Smith, 2010). It was grounded on the top 5 vital priorities associated with the technological development of the country, including information technology (IT), pharmaceuticals and medical technology, nuclear technology as well as space technology together with telecommunications. As a result, Medvedev was able to lay a foundation that would lead the country into economic growth, which would eventually increase his performance ratings and belief in his government.
In 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev founded the Presidential Commission on innovation, composed of almost all government officials in combination with some of the most skilled individuals in business and academia. Additionally, Medvedev indicated that most of the great state businesses would have to be privatized. These corporations were to be of unneeded government states at the regional and federal levels (Smith, 2010). The privatization process meant that the country’s regions were to sell non-essential assets which would be used in funding post-crisis spending. Furthermore, in August 2009, Medvedev ordered Konstantin Chuychenko, the chief of the Audit Directorate of the Presidential Administration of Russia, to explore state establishments for the process (Smith, 2010). This was meant to act as a form of organization to probe their appropriateness for the exercise.
Apart from economic reforms, Medvedev sought to improve law enforcement in Russia which helped increase his power. This followed the shooting in April 2009, which was initiated by a police officer in one of the supermarkets in Moscow. President Dmitry Medvedev started the implementation of the policy by issuing a presidential decree in December 2009. Moreover, a draft law was broadcasted on the internet, subject to public discussion. The citizen’s feedback pushed for modifications to be made to the draft law, which was later submitted in October 2010 to the lower house of the parliament of Russia, the State Duma, by president Medvedev (Wengle, 2022). In January 2011, the State Duma voted on the bill, while the Federation Council did the same in February 2011. The president was then able to approve the bill into law in February 2011, and the changes started to be applied in March 2011. The reform allowed the reduction of Interior Ministry personnel were cut, and centralization of financing and control over the country’s police was initiated. By involving the State Duma and the Federation Council, Medvedev proved to move towards a constitutionalism system.
The Russian government system is designed in a way that corruption largely influences the motive for vertical power. For this reason, President Dmitry Medvedev signed an anti-corruption measures decree in May 2008. The rule started with the formation of an Anti-Corruption Council. The National Anti-Corruption Plan was then published in July 2008 in the official Gazeta newspaper of the Rossiyskaya. The campaign recommended steps aimed at increasing the severity of sanctions for corruption, such as disqualifying municipal and state officials that engaged in minor corruption felonies. The reform also made it customary for state officials to report corruption activities. This step ensured that government officials were not able to abuse their power, promoting a system of constitutionalism. The policy required the government to formulate anti-corruption legislation guided by these suggestions. Furthermore, in December 2008, a corruption counteraction bill was signed into the constitution as Federal Law NO 273-FZ. Following the implementation of this law, the country’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was able to rise to 2.2 in 2009 from 2.1 in 2008 (Buckley, 2018). The increase can be easily interpreted as a somewhat positive response associated with the newly initiated anti-corruption package.
In more efforts to reduce corruption in the country, president Dmitry Medvedev signed presidential decree No. 460 in April 2010, which provided a platform for the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, which was considered a midterm government policy. The new plan was aimed at stipulating sociological research, greater public oversight, and increased fines. However, even with the set policies, Medvedev finally disclosed in April 2010 that the national government had not succeeded in its anti-corruption policies. President Medvedev then signed into law the Amendments to the Criminal and Administrative Offences Code of Russia to help improve the management of the country’s Anti-Corruption measures (Wengle, 2022). This bill allowed the country to raise fines for corruption which would help decrease the problem.
Education is a vital aspect used in improving living standards, empowering the masses, and influencing participation in politics. Individuals are particularly inclined to engage with a system that benefits them, such as initiating an effective education system. For this reason, one can only believe in a government that brings advantages to society. Following this reasoning, president Medvedev also made reforms to the education system. He introduced a new policy in November 2008 referred to as “Our New School.” This followed his message to the Federal assembly terming the education system as weak, which could stall competitiveness in the country. The “Our New School” policy was officiated in February 2010 and became the base of the development of Basic Education in Russia (Pogosian, 2012). The new development program of the Russian schools constituted 5 key components and objectives. These aspects include renewing the education content, retaining, reinforcing, and improving the teaching staff, and presenting new standards of education comprising a system that supports gifted children. In addition, the new education system was to help preserve children’s health and put into place standards for designing classrooms and school buildings, gyms, canteens, and amenities for medical rooms.
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin served Russia between 2000-2008 and 2012 to date. He won his first round of presidency with more than 50% of votes in March 2000 by defeating Gennady Zyuganov (Cale, 2010). Putin is regarded as a strong supporter of a robust central government as an approach to enhancing social and economic modernization (Cohen, 2000). The Russian domestic political policies under president Vladimir Putin were designed to create a strict vertical power in the government. Putin felt that he could use his constitutional powers however he wanted and dismiss the prime ministers in any way he saw fit (Smith, 2010). Putin authorized the dividing of the 89 Russian federal subjects between 7 districts led by representatives chosen by him to help facilitate national administration. Moreover, Putin initiated a reform guiding the enlargement of federal subjects, whose number was reduced to 83 from 89 in 2000. This was after the Russian independent Okrugs were joined with their parent subjects. President Putin further divided the Russian Federation in May 2000 into 7 districts.
In the first two terms of Putin’s presidency, between 2000-2008, he signed various liberal economic policies. These included a reduced profits-tax code, a flat income tax of 13%, and new civil and land codes (Cale, 2010). Over this period, Putin was able to minimize the poverty rate in Russia by half and helped the country’s GDP to grow rapidly. Economic growth in Russia helped improve his approval and influence in the country, boosting his power in the country.
Vladimir Putin sought to ensure that small-scale businesses were able to get better treatment under tax laws. Putin helped replace the old system, accompanied by high taxes, with a new one that was more lenient to small businesses. In attempts to continue this effort, Putin pushed to reduce a single VAT rate as low as possible in February 2009 to help businesses grow (Cale, 2010). Moreover, President Putin was able to establish a corporatist system in Russia in March 2003, which allowed the Kremlin to draw interest in having business relationships with organizations such as the trade union federation and Delovaya Rossiya, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Cohen, 2000). With this, Putin succeeded in involving broad society sectors in promoting economic growth. Furthermore, Putin moved to launch National Priority Projects in 2005 in various fields such as agriculture, education, housing, and healthcare. Putin then proposed to increase prenatal care for women and increase maternity benefits in the healthcare systems with the aim of improving quality of life. Additionally, Putin pushed to increase wages in education and healthcare in 2006 and advocated for the modernization of equipment in this sector in 2007.
In other issues, Putin initiated various protectionist actions and started programs to help draw foreign producers into Russia, which promoted the automotive industry and increased locally produced vehicles’ market share. The government further endorsed legislation to start special economic zones (SEZ) for the purpose of boosting investments by foreign automotive corporations (Domingues et al., 2019). Operating an SEZ was accompanied by various benefits, including the abolishment of land and asset taxes, protection from changes in the tax regime, and tax allowances.
Putin’s presidency has been described often as a sovereign democracy. This is a system designed to accommodate Russia’s own circumstances and traditions, and the policies and actions of the government enjoy influence and support within the country and are not controlled from outside the nation. Putin was given the right to discharge federal subjects’ heads in July 2000, which promoted his authoritarian regime. This was according to the law, suggested by him, and accepted by the Russian Federal Assembly. President Putin conducted a direct governor’s election that ended in 2004 (Zaznaev, 2008). He took this as a step to help dismiss governors that were associated with organized crime and halt separatist tendencies, but it was deemed a temporary move by Dmitry Medvedev in 2012.
Moreover, Putin moved to deal with the political ambitions of various oligarchs from Yeltsin’s era, which led to the imprisonment or exile of individuals such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Boris Berezovsky, and Vladimir Gusinsky. This action was focused on getting rid of opposition and smoothening his term in office. Putin also increased efforts to fight terrorism and organized crime in the country, which ended with a decrease in murder rates by double by 2011 (Rutland, 2000). This resulted in a major reduction in terrorist acts in Russia.
The political system under Putin’s presidency has been labelled to encompass some elements related to lack of transparency in governance, economic liberalism, nepotism, cronyism, and pervasive corruption. Putin was able to initiate steady economic growth in the country but was plagued with absolute corruption of justice, threats to civil society, and the abolition of free media (Cale, 2010). Moreover, Putin’s government has been termed to enforce natalist policies that work by promoting larger families and offering rewards.
President Vladimir Putin continued military operations towards retaking control over Chechnya, thereby addressing the problems of terrorist attacks in 1999. The success of this step helped Putin grow his approval ratings in the country. Furthermore, the rising gas and oil prices in the global market opened ways towards economic recovery and provided resources for the federal government to aid bargain with economic and political actors (Domingues et al., 2019). President Putin also launched various reforms that resulted in the centralization of the political system in Russia, which would undermine the political roles of oligarchs, regional elites, and the legislature.
In 2001, Putin implemented a new law on political parties that required coalitions to have not less than 10000 members. The bill also dictated that parties have official divisions with at least 100 members exceeding half of the sub-federal units if they were to register and remain active (Domingues et al., 2019). Moreover, ethnic, regional, religious, professional, and inter-regional parties were banned with the purpose of weakening ethno-nationalists movements as well as regional elites.
The minimum number of members required was then raised to 50000, together with divisions with at least 500 members exceeding half of the sub-federal units in 2004 (Domingues et al., 2019). Putin also implemented a new law in 2009 towards the reduction of members from 2010 to 45000 and 450 members, further down to 40000 and 400 in 2012 (Domingues et al., 2019). Before this, a federal law was passed in 2002, which raised the electoral barrier of the Duma to 7%, which was to take root as from the 2007 elections (Domingues et al., 2019). However, the Russian Republican party filed a suit in the European Human Rights Court in protest of these measures that led to the annulment of its registration. The courts eventually ruled that the annulment was illegal in 2011 and that the legislation of the Russian party did not satisfy European standards.
Putin also implemented electoral reforms that helped strengthen the federalization and verticalization of political parties. Complementary to the political party system, the electoral system was redesigned using layering and displacement, fortunately with no need to promote any constitutional amendment. The Duma elections were done using a mixed system, with half being selected by a majority system and the other by a closed-list proportional system (Domingues et al., 2019). The closed list proportional system chose parties rather than candidates spurring motivations for the creation of political parties.
In the majority system, the voters selected candidates in local districts, which helped strengthen regional identification. The majority system helped reinforce the accountability of representatives to their respective constituencies. However, this approach could force the influence of regional economic groups, harm part discipline and intensify territorial fragmentation, which can be interpreted to pose a political threat to state integrity in countries containing large ethno territorial cleavages. For this reason, Putin pushed for the replacement of the mixed system for Duma elections with an entirely proportional system in 2005 to be able to curb regionalism and promote the penetration of federal parties in the sub-federal units (Domingues et al., 2019). This step enabled Putin to promote an authoritarian system during his rule. However, the mixed system was later reintroduced in the 2016 Duma elections, which depicted that Russian rules change with what benefits the party in power.
Yeltsin’s presidency necessitated the senator’s mandate to be taken by the speakers and governors of the regional legislative assemblies. However, Putin introduced new measures that would necessitate the removal of governors from federal politics and force accountability on his central government. President Putin adopted a new law in 2000 for the selection of council members where one representative would be chosen by the governor and the other be appointed by the regional legislative assembly (Domingues et al., 2019). This denied regional speakers and governors parliamentary immunity, which is a vital power in the Russian political system.
President Vladimir Putin won his third term in office in 2012 with over 60% of the votes. This was after a bill was passed that would allow him to stay 6 years in office instead of 4 (Smith, 2010). However, protests were held in the country to counter his presidency on allegations of voter fraud (Hale, 2012). The presidency of Putin in the first year of his third term was characterized by attempts to deal with the protest movements, such as the subsequent trial and the Pussy Riot performance on 21 February. Following this, the opposition leaders were incarcerated, while non-governmental establishments collecting funds overseas were branded as foreign agents. This enabled Putin to maintain control over the Russian government.
On the first day of his presidency, Putin exercised his given power by releasing 14 presidential decrees, including one with wide-ranging goals concerning improving the Russian economy. The other decrees were associated with skilled-labor training, education, inter-ethnic relations, housing, and relations with the European Union (EU) (Colton & Hale, 2009). The United Russia party and Putin supported the implementation of a more severe law referred to as the Russian gay propaganda law against the LGBTQ community in Novosibirsk, Arkhangelsk, and Saint Petersburg.
Besides Putin’s anger for power, his time in office was also concerned with environmental policies. Putin authorized the Kyoto Protocol made to minimize the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. However, since the Kyoto Protocol limits emissions to a percentage decrease or increases with reference to the 1990 levels, Russia was able to evade mandatory cuts. Additionally, greenhouse gas emissions in Russia dropped below the 1990 standard following the drop in economic output due to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Henry & Sundstrom, 2010). Moreover, Vladimir Putin continues to promote and supervise various environmental protection plans for endangered and rare animals in Russia, such as the amur tiger, polar bear, white whale, and snow leopard programs.
Putin completed his third term as the president of Russia in 2018. However, he was re-elected for his fourth with a win of over 76% of votes, expected to continue up to 2024 (Gaynullin, 2022). President Putin called Dmitry Medvedev to join his new government as prime minister. Moreover, in May 2018, Putin announced dropping out of the presidential race in 2024 (Gaynullin, 2022). However, in January 2020, Vladimir Putin proposed new constitutional amendments which would enable him to extend his political control in the country after the end of his presidency.
President Putin seized Crimea during his third tenure in office and sponsored the start of a war in eastern Ukraine with several military invasions being made. This led to global sanctions, and Russia entered a financial crisis. Putin continued his efforts to annex Ukraine into his fourth term, where he led a military buildup on the Ukraine border, indicating his authoritarian desire to take over the country and unite it with Russia (Gaynullin, 2022). In February 2022, Putin started a large-scale attack on Ukraine that resulted in global disapproval and expanded sanctions. This opened an investigation in the International Criminal Court over war crimes in Ukraine. Moreover, Vladimir Putin declared a partial mobilization and authorized a forceful takeover of 4 Ukrainian oblasts into Russia, which was illegal in international law.
Putin’s presidency has been branded by rampant corruption and various rights violations such as suppression and intimidation of independent media, repression and jailing of political opponents, and lack of fair and free elections. His rule has led Russia into a democratic relapse and forced a shift into an authoritarian system (White, 2008: Bagashka, 2012). Additionally, Putin’s rule achieved a poor score in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.
Moreover, Putin worked to maintain and improve inter-religious and interethnic peace. This was despite the continuing efforts to reduce illegal migration, ethnic crime, xenophobia, and separatism (Akela, 2017). Putin provided limited state support for Judaism, Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and Buddhism, which were defined as traditional religions of Russia under the law and a component of historical heritage. Vladimir Putin ensured the vast restoration and construction of churches which began in the 1990s. In addition, the state permitted the teaching of religions in schools where guardians and parents were given a choice that allowed their children to learn the fundamentals of one of the traditional religions. President Putin’s strategy for religious policy has been defined as one to support religious freedom and unite various religions under the power of the Russian state. Moreover, Putin has been able to develop good relations with the Patriarchs of the Russian Church and the Jewish community, who consider him a force of stability (Zelenina, 2018). The support that Putin provides for religious communities helps ensure their leaders are able to back him over his control in the country.
President Vladimir Putin also worked to improve internal and external security by reinforcing his authority, police system, and the ultra-modern Russian military. Putin started investing more money into strengthening its military and defense system in 2000. However, the efforts started to be visible in 2008, when Putin continued to modernize the Armed forces of Russia (Akela, 2017). The policy to increase security in the country was mainly led by the Defense Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, under the supervision of Putin. The main components of security reforms were decreasing the number of officers, and reducing the armed forces down to a strength of one million, centralizing the training of officers into 10 pervasive military schooling centres. Other key elements included initiating more auxiliary staff and civilian logistics, establishing a skilled non-commissioned officer (NCO), reorganizing the reserves and army into a brigade system, reducing the central command’s size, and eliminating formations of cadre strength. Putin also moved to increase nuclear weapons acquisitions in the country. He then reduced the number of military districts and the term of draft service, getting rid of the old army harassment traditions.
Findings
The domestic political system of Russia has endured major changes under presidents Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev, and Vladimir Putin. The changes have significantly affected the balance of power between the constitution and the presidency. The presidency of Boris Yeltsin initiated a shift to a market-oriented economy together with political upheaval. His term in office ushered in the introduction of superpresidentialism, in which the president holds major executive power and the ability to overthrow the parliament’s decisions. This was reinforced by the 1993 constitution implemented to weaken parliament’s authority while strengthening presidential control.
Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency was directed towards a more constitutional power. Medvedev assured to endorse better political openness and reduce presidential power. This was evident when his presidency turned towards a more constitutional approach, with more weight being given to enhancing the rule of law and protecting human rights. However, with Putin being the prime minister during his tenure, his presidency was seen more as an extension of Vladimir’s reforms while the actual policies remained limited. Finally, Putin’s presidency is more of a shift from constitutionalism to a presidentialism regime. Putin moved to increase power in the presidency and weaken the government. This allowed him to govern the implementation of constitutional amendments that helped reinforce his control, such as being able to serve more than four years per term.
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