Restructuring the Department of Homeland Security

Introduction

The September 9 attack in 2001 caused much tension throughout the United States. There was a need to safeguard the borders leading to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) formation to prevent similar attacks. In addition to Homeland security, whose primary purpose was to secure the borders and ensure no illegal products or immigrants entered the country, 22 other independent agencies were submerged, forming the DHS. Proper operations of this organization began in 2003 and have been operational. Managerial department problems such as coordination absence, analysis, cyber security, emergency preparedness, and control of funds affect the validity of the DHS, hence there is the need to adopt new strategies to overcome these issues.

The literature review constitutes the organizational structure issues that have affected and continue to limit the DHS’s capabilities in realizing its mission. They include information withholding; poor management fundamentals; failure in cyber security and critical infrastructure protection; emergency unpreparedness; poor procurement and acquisition management. An analysis of these shortcomings gives a clear picture of what is wrong, providing crucial data that can be used to make necessary alterations. The research plan aims to analyze the organizational challenges and provide appropriate remedies to each challenge. The proposals to overcome the identified shortcomings include the frequent exchange of ideas, adopting the national strategy and protection frameworks, implementing the 3 ‘R’s of disaster (readiness, response, and recovery), and improving cost regulations.

A Plan for the Restructuring of the Department of Homeland Security: The Need to Improve DHS’s Effectiveness

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed after the devastating terrorist attack conducted in 2001. A combined 22 federal departments and agencies were unified and integrated as one cabinet agency aiming to safeguard the citizens and prevent similar occurrences. The DHS started its operations formally in 2003, coordinating counterterrorism efforts, and was tasked with protecting the country’s borders and managing the flow of products and people in and out of the United States. Twenty years after its formation, the DHS still faces new challenges. Organizational structure issues such as the lack of information sharing and coordination are proving to be significant setbacks limiting the effectiveness of the DHS. This research plan proposal aims to identify the managerial shortcomings and present possible recommendations to overcome them. It is an important presentation that will help restructure the DHS, thus assuring its efficiency in safeguarding the country against natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other extremities.

Literature Review

Integrating the homeland security agency and the various intelligence has faced different bureaucratic structure issues. With these shortcomings, creating valuable data that can be used to facilitate the Nation’s protection and preparedness against emergencies and attacks has been a challenge. According to Brody (2020), the DHS needs to enhance its organizational system to formulate a common strategy to efficiently prioritize risks across the mission areas. The lack of a standard format for prescribing risks, unclear objectives, and political will were identified as the major problems impeding the realization of the mission and vision (Brody, 2020; Rosen, 2019). The agency requires a lot of funds to overcome the more advanced security problems, especially in the cyber world. In the research by Rosen (2019), a lack of information sharing and coordination with other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has had severe consequences leading to continuous domestic terror attacks and cyber security issues. The directorial department of Homeland Security has experienced safety provision challenges due to mismanagement, especially under the fields discussed below.

Lack of Coordination and Information Sharing

The primary challenge the DHS faces is the lack of coordination among the 22 semi-independent components merged under one umbrella. A lack of unity and harmonization is getting experienced in almost all features of the DHS schemes, including execution, programming, planning, and budgeting, thus leading to inefficiency and waste of funds (Greene, 2021). The United States (U.S.) Customs and Border Protection is tasked with preventing the illegal entry of goods and persons into the U.S. According to Lee (2021), the failure to coordinate with the DHS has resulted in terrorist travel, human trafficking, and drug smuggling across the border. The lack of coordination between the DHS and Border Patrol Agency has increased illegal entries by 70 percent across the Southwest border (Rosen, 2019). The encounter has increased, making the elimination process a challenge. Due to infective communication between the two agencies, no long-lasting solution has been identified. Without coordination, there is no information sharing; hence it has become hard to prevent terrorism, understand the evolving trends, prevent hostile individuals, and enhance the community preparedness against disasters or attacks.

The sharing of information that is related to domestic threats of terrorism within the department and between other entities is a responsibility that DHS needs to accomplish. Homeland Security must be able to access and analyze law enforcement information to identify and assess the nature of terrorist threats, but this has been a challenge (Brody, 2020). Cyber security is one major factor that has made it risky to share crucial findings through the internet. Rosen (2019) states that the restrictions imposed by other agencies in exchanging sensitive operational information are also a challenge. In the research by Lee (2021), the major problem concerning information sharing is the inability to turn large amounts of data into valuable intelligence. The enduring problem is further associated with a lack of advanced analytics, such as training and new techniques to facilitate a smooth transfer. Since the agency depends on external sources for data, quality control of this shared information is a challenge (Rosen, 2019). The intelligence needed to support national security may be inaccurate or vague hence the inability to share the findings.

Poor Management Fundamentals

Proper governance is crucial to the success of any organization hence the need to have strong leadership. The DHS continues to face enduring shortcomings that cause significant challenges in overseeing and managing the department’s mission. As a result, every aspect of the vision statement, from ensuring disaster preparedness, cyber security, border protection, and terrorism prevention, is affected (Atkins & Lawson, 2022). Each time the department faces managerial setbacks, thus a need to work as a single entity to accomplish the set objectives. Gradoń (2020), in his research, states that disinformation is experienced, resulting in the sharing of misleading news before or after disasters, thus affecting the DHS’s ability to fulfill its mission. In their article, Albert, Nikolaev, and Jacobson (2022) state that management fundamentals include proper internal control, meaningful performance metrics, and having complete and accurate data on the operations and the cost incurred. This setback is further categorized into three sub-categories: performance measurement, collecting and analyzing cost data, and collecting the required facts. The identified shortcomings are cumulative, interrelated, and propagated by the lack of discipline in organizational foundations.

The ongoing difficulties the DHS faces fall under the three sub-sections and require proper research to identify the best solutions. The department fails to prioritize intelligence collection, obtain sufficient data and does not substantiate the information received to guarantee its accuracy (Gradoń, 2020; Rosen, 2019). Lack of accountability and complete information is experienced throughout the department and the integrated agencies and is occasionally accompanied by weak internal controls and little oversight from the leaders (Rosen, 2019). The DHS leadership fails to assert its supremacy over the other elements, thus ensuring it gets the required specifics that can be used to enhance security within the borders. In their study, Albert et al. (2022) indicate that, like most other federal agencies, the DHS does not collect cost data for programs and operations. Most successful businesses track the cost data since the performance fee directly influences revenue. The lack of preparation impacts the ability of Homeland Security to make any new initiatives or policy changes that will result in the agency’s restructuring (Atkins & Lawson, 2022). As a result, the bureau cannot fully realize its full potential.

Failure in Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection

Cyber security is currently the most common challenge facing the DHS and has resulted in the increased number and elegance of attacks against information systems and the country’s crucial groundwork. The DHS requested about $1.6 billion to safeguard its information-sharing platforms, legacy systems, and the interconnected networks within the firm (Baggott & Santos, 2020). Failing to secure these assets proved risky as it increased the chances of data misuse, manipulation, and unauthorized access. Over the years, the department has faced external threats from cyber-terrorist groups and hackers. In June 2022, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the FBI announced an attempt by Chinese state-sponsored hackers who targeted significant network providers and telecommunication companies in the U.S. and breached their servers (Katagiri, 2023). Previously, the U.S. Treasury Departments Office of Foreign Assets Control announced that the Ronin Network attack, which led to the loss of about $540 million, was attributed to a North Korean Hacking group (Katagiri, 2023; Limba et al., 2019). The Department of Homeland Security had failed to coordinate with the other intelligence firms to safeguard cyberspace security hence the continuous data breaches and hacking.

The number of hacks against physical infrastructure in the United States has increased, prompting the intervention of several agencies such as the FBI, CIA, and DHS. In particular, Homeland Security ensures all local buildings are protected from physical or online destruction. The agency has failed to fulfill this hence the continuous attack on government and non-government buildings. In 2021, a ransomware attack was launched against Colonial Pipeline, a major US energy firm that transports nearly half of the fuel used on the East Coast (Katagiri, 2023). Senior officials cited this successful attack as one of the most severe cybersecurity threats in the country (Katagiri, 2023). Nearly 400 ransomware incidents in 2020 targeted physical infrastructure, and the DHS and its constituents failed to prevent or foresee any (Katagiri, 2023; Limba et al., 2019). The DHS established a National Technology Guard to help local companies recover and respond to systems and information attacks (Limba et al., 2019). Failure to coordinate between this department and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has prompted a collapse in formulating security policies.

Poor Emergency Preparedness

Disasters strike at any time and place and can occur without warning. The Federal Government’s Emergency Management and Preparedness Agency (FEMA) collaborates with federal, local, and state agencies to ensure that during and after emergencies, all survivors are taken care of, and all their needs met. FEMA has experienced catastrophic calamities such as the hurricanes Irma, Maria, and Harvey in 2017 (Welch, 2022). The failure to adequately prepare leads to a significant change in legislation. Hurricane Katrina exposed the DHS and other agencies inability to fully prepare for large-scale emergencies (Boersma et al., 2021). Insufficient resources and funding proved to be the deciding factor, and lack of coordination. The limitations proved crucial to the constructive gathering of the state and local assets in repose to the disaster. FEMA was integrated into the DHS in 2003, but its relevance has been questioned, primarily when significant calamities like Hurricane Katrina occur (Boersma et al., 2021). The recovery efforts were stalled, and the evacuation processes faced challenges from a lack of good leadership and integration with other local bureaus.

The U.S. is one of the most geographically diverse nations in the world, as it incorporates territories like Puerto Rico, Alaska, and Hawaii. Consequently, this country is hazard-prone because of its large size. An acute frosty climate affects the northern region, and tropical storms and hurricanes impact the southeast (Welch, 2022). After the 2001 attack and the passing of the Comprehensive Homeland Security Act in 2003, much attention was given to terrorism (Brody, 2020). The President of the United States (POTUS) and congress approve billions of dollars to promote bioterrorism preparedness, infrastructure protection, and communication (Welch, 2022). Emergency preparedness is given limited funding, especially against natural occurrences, and changes were only made after the Hurricane Katrina disaster. The DHS fails to properly plan for the funds as much more is used in one sector, forgetting the others. It was the non-success of the department and federal government during the Katrina calamity that this shortcoming came to light. The U.S. policy on catastrophes is not static and frequently changes when unplanned occurrences strike.

Poor Procurement and Acquisition Management

The DHS can not coordinate alone in preventing the Nation from all terrors and natural mishaps. Challenges get experienced when the agency tries to fulfill its missions. Thus, acquisition management has been essential in realizing the objectives since the 2001 attacks. The department spends billions of dollars each year acquiring various services and assets, including ships, human resources, nuclear detection equipment, surveillance towers, and aircraft (Roberts & Schmid, 2022). Technology is vital as it facilitates the easy sharing and storing of data that may be critical in the fight against terror. The major problem getting experienced is the overspending and the poor service provision of the equipment acquired. There are no uniform procedures and policies across the whole bureau, making coordination hard or impossible (Roberts & Schmid, 2022). Additionally, the leadership of the DHS fails to establish financial management principles that will steer the agency toward its mission, thus supporting the strategic priorities and goals (Sadiq & Kessa, 2020). Financial shortages are common in some sections of the DHS hence the negative perception by the public as the taxpayers’ dollars are perceived to be misused.

Congress increased the 2022 financial year funding to help the DHS achieve its objectives. The finance was raised by $5.1 billion and an additional $18.8 billion for disaster management and recovery (Cuffari, 2022). Independent auditors issued an unfavorable opinion, concluding that the bureau experienced material weakness affecting internal financial reporting control. Additionally, fragility was found in data systems and information technology control (Brody, 2020; Cuffari, 2022). Noncompliance with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 and the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 was further identified (Cuffari, 2022). Homeland Security failed to provide government administrators with timely, factual, and reliable financial management data. The department could not comply with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) in the previous financial year (Cuffari, 2022). Improper payments were identified, which proved the misuse of funds provided. The operational, organizational, and economic factors change experienced affect the DHS’s ability to attain its objective hence the need to restructure the department.

Recommendations

Change is critical in ensuring benefits are realized and the former shortcomings conquered. The benefits likely to be experienced include reduced costs, increased efficiency, better communication, and information sharing (Sadiq & Kessa, 2020). Records will be taken accurately and stored where they can be easily accessed when a computerized filling system is adopted. Reorganizing the DHS will be beneficial as it will provide new grounds to overcome the identified organizational structure issues and make it easy to integrate homeland security and the different intelligence agencies (Rosen, 2019). The unification will make it easy for information to get shared without limitations. The restructuring will further eliminate layers of management, thus improving decision-making and communication (Rosen, 2019). With innovations, new threats emerge and require modern strategies to be eliminated. Major disasters such as the Coronavirus pandemic require action and involvement of all levels of the government, non-profit sectors, and other numerous departments (Welch, 2022). The recommendations are to ensure the DHS integrates with other agencies and enhances information sharing to promote better working conditions.

Fusion of Actionable Intelligence Information

Coordination and information sharing with other agencies, such as the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), will facilitate the protection of the United States from attacks and other disasters. Prayatna et al. (2022) suggest having more fusion centers that will analyze and share crucial findings, thus assisting homeland partners in preventing, protecting, and responding to security threats. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are critical in helping safeguard the country as they serve as important channels for countering domestic terrorism and sharing necessary homeland security data (Ritchie, 2020). Since Homeland Security primarily focuses on border protection, it lacks jurisdiction to access certain information outside the borders. Integrating the CIA will be beneficial in accessing foreign data as the agency can operate in overseas countries. The FBI can be engaged in federal crimes such as drug trafficking, immigration, and piracy, which are the common problems Homeland Security faces apart from terrorism (Ritchie, 2020). Information sharing will speed up surveillance and increase the chances of preventing attacks before they occur.

There is a need for the DHS to advance, document and carry through comprehensive information security programs within the department and across the agencies to secure intelligence and data systems. A common framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and technology should be used in managing all cyber risks. A fusion center will facilitate and improve the ability of DHS to prevent criminal activities and safeguard the Nation. In these facilities, a mechanism will be provided under which private, public safety, and law enforcement partners join with one purpose in mind (Ritchie, 2018). The DHS must use online data-sharing tools like Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) and Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (Ritchie, 2018). There is a need to have good relationships with foreign intelligence agency counterparts. Sometimes other nations have access to crucial data that the DHS might need. The U.S. must work with other countries to collect and share findings on global problems like terrorism, weapons proliferation, and drug trafficking (Ritchie, 2020). The information gaps will be quickly filled, and the Nation’s safety will be safeguarded.

Adopting the National Strategy

Success in preventing future terrorist attacks within the U.S. borders depends on the ability of the DHS to gather, analyze and share data and intelligence. The information must be related to those wanting to attack, the potential targets, and the tactics they intend to use while striking. Lee (2021) states that the war against terror requires a shift and use of all elements. The sharing of intelligence and information will play a significant role in enabling the DHS to overcome all challenges, safeguard the Nation against terrors or attacks, and adequately prepare for natural disasters (Rosen, 2019). Greater flexibility and persistence is needed to challenge the threats brought by transnational terrorist movements that are determined to destroy the Nation, limiting the freedoms enjoyed by the citizens (Ritchie, 2018). The DHS needs to work with the federal government and other partners to transform the policies, procedures, processes, and workplace trends to promote the information-sharing culture (Sadiq & Kessa, 2020). Information exchange should be the rule across the whole department to combat terror attacks.

Making information sharing a priority under this big umbrella tasked with homeland security is critical. The strategy needs to be documented in a single file, thus guiding other agencies through the provision of the administration’s plans. Initiatives and programs drafted to facilitate and advance the exchange of terrorism-related findings need to be implemented (Rosen, 2019). The approach will help the command ensure that all employees in the local, state, and federal governments tasked with the Nation’s security respond appropriately to attacks. This procedure will establish a plan to build upon progress and a more consolidated information-sharing capability (Rosen, 2019). Through this, those needing intelligence to protect the country will easily access it, and those with the particulars will easily share. There is a need for timely access to accurate data about the potential attackers, their plans, and their activities. The information availability will guide the department’s efforts toward identifying immediate and long-term threats and the people involved in the coercion activities (Gradoń, 2020). There is no single source of terrorism-related information hence the need to gather, fuse and analyze the related data from various sources.

Adopting the National Protection Framework

Preparedness is an essential component that facilitates the attainment of the protection mission, including measures to deter risks, lessen liabilities or reduce repercussions of a particular incident. Adequate protection and hardening of targets across the Nation rely on the close alignment and coordination of the various security agencies (Atkins & Lawson, 2022). With this approach, more emphasis is placed on critical infrastructure protection, border, health, maritime, transportation, immigration, and cyber security. Adopting this framework will enable the DHS to address fundamental abilities that result in the domestic protection of the country. As a result, the U.S. air, borders, land, and sea will be secured, and the flow of lawful commerce and travel will be facilitated. The protection structure will be an excellent implementation as it guides preventing, avoiding, or stopping an impending danger to the Homeland (Brody, 2020). It promotes a shared comprehension of the safekeeping operation that supports interactivity and intelligence exchange.

The delivery and development of protection core capabilities require guiding principles such as resilience and scalability, risk-informed culture, and shared responsibility. Homeland security needs to adopt flexibility as it will enable the preparation for and adaptation of the changing conditions and be able to recover fast from disruptions (Albert et al., 2022). The adjustment can be enhanced through installing security systems, hardening facilities, applying cyber security measures, and improving security protocols. With versatile capabilities, the department will be able to meet evolving and unforeseen needs of differing intensity and complexity (Albert et al., 2022). A risk-informed culture will help monitor emerging hazards and threats and the danger they create through situational and vigilance awareness.

Additionally, imminence-informed decisions and information sharing through coordination with the varying bureaus will allow the delivery of pertinent data to stakeholders, who will use it to conduct analysis and take action. The DHS should enhance sharing by engaging in partnerships that will facilitate the exchange of ideas, effective practices, intelligence, and security planning (Atkins & Lawson, 2022). Integrated processes are also critical in achieving the shared vision of securing the Nation and need the incorporation of private and government agencies.

Adopting the Three ‘R’s of Disasters

The three ‘R’s Homeland needs to integrate with their disaster management plan, including readiness, response, and recovery. They focus on ensuring things return to normal after attacks or natural disasters and mainly involve establishing new technologies, schemes, tools for amendments, and abilities. Apart from information sharing, there is a need to have mutual aid agreements with all relevant agencies and training of concerned citizens and response personnel (White, 2019). If an attack or calamity strikes, first responders might be from any department, depending on the location of the incident. As a result, it is crucial to have good communication with non-governmental and state organizations to have clear guidelines on how to respond when needed. There is a need to conduct catastrophe exercises to fortify test capabilities and training (White, 2019). Through readiness, all-hazards education campaigns must be presented to school citizens on what to do when natural mishaps like hurricanes or earthquakes occur.

The DHS needs to develop an evacuation plan, know possible routes from any region, and identify community partners. After finalizing the first step, the agency needs to have response actions ready before, during, and after emergencies. Proper planning will enable the department to save lives, reduce economic losses, and prevent suffering (White, 2019). All these activities can not be implemented by the Homeland alone and require help from other facilities such as hospitals. In a more recent encounter, the DHS coordinated with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), resulting in a speedy response against the pandemic, thus keeping the citizens safe (Dzigbede et al., 2020). Good relationships will ensure timely communication with relevant partners hence the timely provision of care or security. Additionally, the DHS needs good recovery strategies to help the community return to customary conditions, such as restoring essential services such as health care (Dzigbede et al., 2020). Other services the department will need to coordinate to be provided include the reconstruction of new roads, basic facilities, and bridges.

Improve Cost Efficiencies Within DHS

In the past, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found some discrepancies across the DHS. A report was generated from the findings to help the department strengthen the identified areas and their effectiveness and efficiency in operations. The agency needs to adopt the cost efficiency strategy, thus ensuring it uses the minimal amount possible to offer the same services (Cuffari, 2022). There is a need to set a budget to help mitigate extra charges. A department-wide contract will ensure the organization purchases items in bulk, thus receiving high-volume discounts. With this implementation, especially when buying electronic gadgets and other subscriptions, the DHS will save about $90 million in about ten years (Brody, 2020). There is a need to improve how the departments’ resources and assets are used to enhance cost savings.

Proper governance within the firm will ensure wireless communication optimization, fuel, fleet, and information technology (IT) inventory capabilities. The optimization will curb the payment of air cards and cell phones that are not in use (Prayatna et al., 2022). The fuel initiative will establish an agreement between the DHS and other subsequent agencies to purchase bulk oil at a much lower rate, thus saving (Prayatna et al., 2022). The price per gallon is about 3.5 dollars in retail, but the wholesale price is about 2.6 dollars (Prayatna et al., 2022). Consequently, the agency needs to change the types of vehicles used and transition to hybrid ones with a lower consumption (Prayatna et al., 2022). In enhancing communication and data analysis, computers and servers are vital. The DHS needs to adopt IT efficiencies which will result in the storage of intelligence in hard drives, thus doing away with data centers which lead to cost savings.

Conclusion

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) primary focus is to ensure the United States border is secured and the citizens within are protected from potential harm from terrorist groups. In coordination with other agencies, the department also safeguards the people’s interests and helps when natural disasters occur. The DHS currently faces some organizational structure challenges that limit the attainment of its set objectives. Its effectiveness in protecting the interests of the citizens and the country has been deteriorating. As a result, there is a need to restructure the whole department. Common deficiencies experienced include poor coordination and information sharing, managerial issues, failure to enhance cyber security and critical infrastructure protection, poor emergency preparedness, and atrocious procurement strategies. Fusing actionable intelligence with other agencies is crucial in promoting protection and disaster management. Additionally, the agency needs to adopt the national approach, the domestic mechanism, and the three ‘R’s, ensuring it can prepare for attacks or disasters and protect the country and its citizens. Lastly, it needs to improve cost efficiencies to curb misuse of taxpayer funds, thus investing more in sectors that require much attention.

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