The checks and balances system allows each branch of government to promote individual capabilities to control the other two. The legislative branch can impeach the President, while the latter can veto specific legislation (Ginsburg et al. 21). The President, in turn, can nominate judges, and members of the judiciary have the power to mark presidential decrees as unconstitutional (Duignan and DeCarlo 48). Finally, the judiciary can also review the legislature and rule on the unconstitutionality of specific laws, but the powers of the legislature allow for the impeachment of judges (Duignan and DeCarlo 48). This system of checks and balances helps the three branches control one another.
When considering three branches of government, the Founding Fathers wanted to make the legislative branch the most powerful. The concentration of power in one person had negative historical examples, and the appointment of an appropriate body to control legislative aspects was intended to restrain the power of the President. As a result, today, the legislative branch is the most powerful since the provisions of the Constitution give it broad control over the other two branches. In addition, the powers of the Congress are extended, which also proves the primacy of this branch.
If I had an opportunity to become the President of the United States, I would hardly agree to this decision. Firstly, this position is associated with strong pressure, and the responsibility for the fate and development of the nation is colossal. Secondly, the presidency requires sufficient experience in the work of the government apparatus, and this path is also fraught with many difficulties. Finally, this position requires innate leadership skills, and I am not sure that my knowledge is enough to lead the country and make inflexible decisions in the face of today’s geopolitical tensions.
Duignan, Brian, and Carolyn DeCarlo, editors. The Judicial Branch: Evaluating and Interpreting Laws. The Rosen Publishing Group, 2018.
Ginsburg, Tom, et al. “Designing Presidential Impeachment.” University of Chicago Public Law Working Paper, vol. 731, 2019, pp. 1-59.