Introduction
The patronal politics theory proposed by Hale explores a new way of understanding events in the world often interpreted as democratization, rising authoritarianism, or revolution. His theory offers a robust yet supple explanation of all the empirical diversity (Hale, 2015). The theory synthesizes the post-Soviet societies as they entered a period of wild turbulence. Where the rule of law is weak and corruption pervasive, what may appear to be democratic or authoritarian breakthroughs are often just regular, predictable phases in longer-term cyclic dynamics – patronal politics. According, to Hale (2015), “politics in societies where individuals organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments through chains of actual acquaintance, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal principles such as ideological belief or categorization.” Where patronal politics exists, power is distributed along hierarchical networks through which resources are allocated and coercion applied. In the post-soviet space, power is acquired and utilized by means of favors that the networks (also called clients) carry out for their patrons. It is usually in the form of completion of material acquisition for patrons in exchange for some payout or favor.
Political Regimes of Former Soviet Region
The patronal politics theory by Hale (2015) explains the tendency of former regimes in the Soviet region to revert to autocratic, corrupt, personalistic, and patronage-based forms of rule. Former regimes experienced periods of stability but were sometimes punctuated with an outburst of popular protests. Other times, no upheaval erupted despite oppression by the ruling class. Hale (2015) goes on to explain the reasons for the different outcomes. He attributes the varied response by the subjects to the tendency of regimes in the 1990s to form a single, dominant political machine organized around one leader. The leader in such a system serves as the chief patron atop a pyramid of low-level machines. The low-level machines are all connected through networks of mutual interest. In some cases, the state power intermingles with organized crime syndicates to achieve its goals. Commonly, the state cronies and family members of the leader control lucrative assets in exchange for the benefits of power. Therefore, rulers grant their cronies the right to enrich themselves in return for political support. Patronal politics thrives on the Eurasian culture-based understanding that the ultimate patron deserves privileges, regardless of the violation of other people’s rights.
Genesis of Modern Patronal Social Relations
Suppose you are waiting in the queue for your passport, and the wait is dragging on because the queue is long. Suddenly, someone enters the facility without checking in a walks straight to the front of the queue. The person then assures the patiently waiting people that the person in charge is his/her relative. The individual proceeds and has his or her passport processed before the others. In European countries, America, or any other liberal countries, that act would be utterly intolerable. However, in Eurasian culture, especially in ex-Soviet countries, this is not only considered acceptable but is expected. For instance, if the person in charge told the relative to wait like everybody else, the onlooking people will perceive that as contempt. Throughout Eurasian culture, these kinds of relations are applied by the ruling class to maintain their domination over society. Based on the observation of the Eurasian culture, Hale (2015) constructed the theory of patronal politics to analyze the post-soviet world. It helps us attain a deeper insight into how the first great communist experiment operated, and how it failed. Besides, the patronal system helps us understand Eurasian society as it is now, and precisely how citizens overcome the patronal system.
Structure of the Patronal System
The patronal system pyramid structure exists from the top, where the patron-in-chief (head of state) wields the most power. The power hierarchy extends down to sub-patrons (oligarchs, directors of institutions, and family members), and down to lower levels of the political world (working, political classes, and prominent business persons), all the way to private and personal lives of citizens (Weber, 2019). Notably, this informal system is so extensive that the daily lives of the working class are required to play the game. Opposers or those who stand in the way may be reprimanded by highly corrupt businesses and the legal sector to maintain ideological and material power. According to Hale (2015), the informality of the patronal system embeds corruption and forms the basis of social equilibrium. In the social equilibrium and corrupt system, everyone expects others to behave in a particular way since behaving contraryly attracts severe consequences for the person and possibly their dependents (Weber, 2019). For example, when somebody reports political corruption or notifies the police of crimes committed by a family member of a prominent leader, they can be punished immensely by the state-repressive apparatus and legal system. In Eurasian culture, it is understood and accepted that a position of power should be used to benefit the family.
Factors Promoting Patronism
Hale (2015) cited three factors emphasized in classical studies on how patrons manage to sustain patronal politics. The first one is the patron’s continued access to valuable resources for rewarding loyal clients. Secondly, the power of enforcement allows a leader to selectively deliver punishment to the disloyal. Finally, the capacity of a patron to monitor clients and sub-patrons. Notably, the prominent figures in the hierarchy who have clients of their own are sometimes clients of more powerful patrons.
It can be deduced that a patron exists to protect class privileges, and sub-patrons and lower levels endorse a given patron. However, even powerful patrons have been brutally removed from power by more powerful individuals, if they are not satisfied with the maintenance of the feudal order. It is important to consider the mass protest in Kyrgyzstan, which resulted in the purge of the parasitic oligarch in 2005 and 2010. The purge is never in the interest of justice, but to establish an oligarchy loyal to the preservation of the new socioeconomic order (Weber, 2019). Subsequent oligarchs also seek to maximize their self-interest, while maintaining an unspoken rules-based system managed by the chief patron.
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The Logic of Expectation
The unspoken rule-based system ensures the ruling class plays nicely with each other- logic of expectation. Within the logic of expectation, clients obey the patrons when they expect other clients to do the same (Weber, 2019). The workplace is an ideal example of understanding how the logic of expectation works. Often, the best action for workers in many situations is to go on strike. However, if the logic of expectation inclines some people to doubt the willingness of others to join the strike, then workers will not participate in such an endeavor. Besides, If the consequences could outweigh the benefits of unlikely success, the chances are that workers will not go on strike. A breakdown of the logic of expectation often results in sub-patrons and other loyalists breaking away from the patron. The breakaway often happens because the expectations and norms are radically shaken through the new reforms, which makes sub-patrons in the upper echelons of government jump ship. What usually happens in the patronal system is that it controls people, including the patrons who must comply with the patronal laws of motion beyond their control.
The Pyramid Structures
A rigid pyramid is a single social network that extends from the patron-in-chief to the sub-patron, to clients, all the way down to everyone. Rules in this pyramid are strict and deviation is met with brutality (Weber, 2019). The loose patronal pyramid is relaxed and liberal, and sub-patrons can develop a competing pyramid (Weber, 2019). The third is a two-pyramid structure, which combines two or more patronal structures competing or co-existing in the same society.
The presidential system is an example of a constitutional structure compatible with a rigid patronal pyramid. A president always serves as the patron-in-chief and controls the society through sub-patrons. The sub-patrons, who have economic and political monopolies, help the president maintain a single patronal pyramid throughout the entire society. A semi-presidential system, on the contrary, tends to reflect a compromised division of power (Weber, 2019). For example, power is shared between the president and prime minister in a semi-presidential system. A pure parliamentary constitution often exists to provide an illusion of weakening executive powers. Since the prime ministers operate at the behest of the parliament, they can be easily replaced by the president, and consequently, a loose formation emerges.
A Case Study of Kyrgyzstan
The 2005 revolt, called the Tulip Revolution, was triggered by dissatisfaction with the elections and government of President Askar Akaev. Many believed the reason for overthrowing Akaev’s government was corruption in state bodies. Nevertheless, the Tulip Revolution is attributed to many reasons, including the country’s liberal political environment, economic state, the rivalry between the political elites on presidential succession, and the incumbent president’s unpopularity. The president’s aggressiveness in immersing wealth in the family, driving close allies to the opposition and creating general dissatisfaction with his rule.
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President Kurmanbek Bakiev elected five years earlier, was overthrown in 2010 for an almost similar allegation of the previous regime. For instance, the revolution against Bakiev was due to dissatisfaction with corruption, nepotism, the rising cost of utilities, and abuse of power. While his predecessor resigned and fled to Russia, Bakiev opted to fly to Belarus. Kyrgyzstan became the original post-Soviet republic to face a repeat of almost similar revolution based on the patronal presidential policies. Notably, the Tulip Revolution did not alter patronal presidentialism but changed the person in that position.
Post-election Protest of 2020 and Revolution Mechanism Comparison
Many fundamental issues that sparked the revolution in 2005 and 2010 were never addressed in Kyrgyzstan. For example, the citizens become dissatisfied with the current situation brought by the patron system. Dissatisfaction with corruption, nepotism, material reward and punishment, the rising cost of essential utilities, and misappropriation of public resources. Despite the regime circles, new patrons managed to maintain and increase pyramids of powers because of the nominal restrictions of presidential powers.
The 2020 revolution varies from the previous two because it was motivated by the rejection of patronal networks besides systematic corruption and nepotism that had become a characteristic of Kyrgyzstan’s politics. Formal institutions that sprang from political struggles and their logic of operation also made the 2020 revolt unique. Overall, the Tulip and Bloody Revolution of 2010 greatly influenced the 2020 revolution as characterized by clashes common across all the protests. Whenever the center cannot hold, loyalists and sub-patrons have shown a willingness to defect as circumstances demand. Although the outlook of the defection may seem good, the sole purpose is mainly to realign with those in control and further self-interests. It coincides with Hale’s analogy when the logic of expectation breaks down.
Social Disequilibrium: A Threat to Patronal Politics Status
The post-Soviet was characterized by chaos and confusion regarding expectations and led to a period of extreme flux or social disequilibrium. According to Hale (2015), patronal politics took time to adjust before consolidating into systems that control the entire states. The concept is evident in Kyrgyzstan, where people in some states revolted against the resigning regime. Consequently, leaders and respective clients needed to learn how to navigate the new terrain, with the most capable patrons prevailing through natural selection. Within the chaos and confusion, reigning presidents during the revolutions resorted to state violence to consolidate political powers and hierarchical oligarch influence.
The pool of potential contenders for state power got slimmer as economic power narrowed due to the transition to capitalism in post-Soviet Eurasia. Since the transition to capitalism, patrons had to develop their class consciousness and resolve their competing interests to establish a strong state and maintain the new order. During the post-Soviet period, the need for patrons to establish a strong state happened in a single period of a few years with an immense impact on society. The brief period of Western-style capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union gave the masses a feeling that they were taking part in social transformation. However, the informal networks remained in Kyrgyzstan and no threat of violence or force took place until 2005. 2005, 2010, and 2020 revolutions demonstrate the idea of competing pyramid patronal networks, where a divided executive competition for power is likely to prevail after the revolution.
Failures of Previous Regimes Leading to Revolution
The sequential events of demonstration effects following the economic meltdown facilitated the exit of President Akaev. After long years of economic difficulties and perceived corruption, the president’s popularity gradually decreased. Besides, Akaev drove more elite politicians into opposition while trying to restrict the powers of key patronage groups. Further, an attempt to crack down and suppress the revolt led to the decreased popularity of the reigning presidents in all the revolutions. Most of the staff and leading sub-patrons fled to opposition to secure a place under the new regime- a move Hale (2015) refers to “syndrome of leaving power.” Most of the defectors were trusted allies who primarily wanted to side with the winning coalition.
An increasing negative sentiment among the public facilitated the revolutions, particularly due decreasing economy, inherited economic issues, and monopoly of resources. Failure to address corruption and attempts by the rulers to establish authority via small circles of associates further made the situation worse. The public defiance towards the authority, including close allies, increased due to the monopolization of the state, especially by relatives of the patrons. Protest intensified between the protesters and the police, each attacking with weapons.
The 2005 and 2010 revolutions present an excellent illustration of how patronal politics can result in abrupt and dramatic changes to a regime. A contentious election has been the focal point of these revolutions, indicating most people value democracy and transparency in electing leaders. Therefore, people revolt to express their frustration with the reigning regime’s election meddling and demand change in the absence of democracy. Tactics that have worked for subjects in Kyrgyzstan are the use of demonstrations, protests, and civil disobedience.
Limits of the Patronal Presidentialism Theory
Patronal presidentialism has been at the center of societal critique and opposition contests in all of Kyrgyzstan’s uprisings. In Hale’s perspective, revolutions are swings within the regime-elite relationships, where elites attempt to challenge the patron if the latter is perceived as a lame duck (Doolotkeldieva, 2021). Despite the regular changes in formal rules, patronal presidentialism remains the main logic, ordering power, and decision-making. However, Hale’s logic overlooks the factors lying outside the political machine. According to Doolotkeldieva (2021), Hale’s mechanism of change does not fit the dynamics within the patronal presidentialism shortly before the October 2020 elections in Kyrgyzstan. Notably, the dynamics of patronal politics were not connected to President Jeenbekov’s succession phases since he was only halfway through his regime. Most of the elites had interests in his continuation because of their re-election into the new parliament. Therefore, the uprising against patronal presidentialism was unexpected to political actors, both inside and outside the political machine.
Hale’s model does not allow for a precise determination of when presidential popularity will tip toward the negative end.
Doolotkeldieva (2021) notes that the president constantly engages in all sorts of manipulations to retain power in highly informal systems. Therefore, the shift in popular opinion does not automatically send a clear message to the public and the opposition. In the recent Kyrgyzstan revolution, the contingency and uncertainty of events seem to be plausible elements of mass mobilization (Doolotkeldieva, 2021). According to Doolotkeldieva (2021), the revolution can be attributed to a wider context, unexpected events, latent societal processes, and elite strategies whose intended outcomes may be far from intended. The dramatic events open the door to a multitude of public perception, hopes, and opinions, fears, concerns, whose magnitude and diversity is beyond the reach of elite strategies. For instance, no one could anticipate Omurbek Babanov would lose popularity within a few days due to street pressure.
Conclusion
The Hale Patronal Politics theory explains all the revolutions that happened in Kyrgyzstan between 2005 and 2020. The same concerns about lack of political freedom, poor economy, discontent with the current regime, corruption, and nepotism have dominated the last three revolutions. The lack of reforms despite the emerging new regime indicates the Eurasian culture persists among the populace. Consequently, people in power conveniently exploit patronal politics and Eurasian culture embedded in the societal culture to advance self-interest and exercise control over the masses.
The 2020 protest was unique from the other two since the forces behind the revolution were formal institutions arising from political struggles. Nevertheless, Hale’s theory of patronal presidentialism does not explicitly the dynamics of the recent 2020 revolution. The recent revolution was partly modeled around a wide context, unexpected events, latent societal processes, and elite strategies whose outcome is unpredictable.
References
Doolotkeldieva, A. (2021). The 2020 Violent Change in Government in Kyrgyzstan Amid the Covid-19 Pandemic: Three Distinct Stories in One. In A. Doolotkeldieva, Between Peace and Conflict in the East and the West (pp. 157-174). Springer, Cham.
Hale, H. (2015). Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Weber, D. (2019). Marxism and Patronal Theory. The Political Science Journal, 6(3), 1-21.