Introduction
As the Incident Commander and principal security planner for the upcoming Democratic-Republican National Convention in Miami, the primary task is to develop effective crowd-control tactics based on frontline officer feedback. The MDPD responded to the 1980 McDuffie riots by developing Mobile Field Force, a revolutionary crowd-control strategy. However, there have been periods of inaction in the department when ideas were suppressed. Dissecting past innovations’ successes and failures helps identify areas for improvement, enabling the acceptance and implementation of new doctrines for future research and development needs.
Successful Innovations at MDPD
The primary catalyst for earlier advancements in MDPD’s crowd control strategies was a crisis that exposed the shortcomings of existing strategies. The McDuffie riots of 1980 changed the department’s course drastically, killing 18, injuring 180, and causing $100 million in damages because the officers were not prepared for violence. In this disaster, it was shown that MDPD’s traditional crowd control methods are ineffective and incapable of dealing with large-scale civic unrest.
Civic leaders and public members were obligated to ensure that such a humiliating incident never happens again. This allowed middle managers to fully redesign the MDPD’s operational framework, providing the drive and depth of action necessary for transformative leadership (Carvalho et al., 2023). Once the necessity—McDuffie’s death—was eliminated, the idea for the Mobile Field Force emerged.
Consequently, in the years leading to the 2003 FTAA conference, the MFF group identified that the tactics they had successfully implemented in the 80s/90s would fail if they were executed against violent anti-globalization protesters. Seattle, Genoa, and other violent protests marked the end of the old regime and showed that a new paradigm was needed. Rather than being a failure internally, the institution’s resistance to the reforms intensified because of who was pushing them (Thieman, 2020). The formation of a core group tasked with monitoring threats and developing solutions was crucial to this accomplishment. The new task force officers, whose modifications varied from proactive measures to mobility, were less susceptible to the outdated Field Force committee’s prejudice.
Factors That Blocked Other Innovations
Even though the MDPD has a proven track record of making progress during crisis management, the department encountered several institutional impediments that hindered other creative endeavors, making the organization appear inflexible. An illustrative example was the transformation of the Mobile Field Force Training Committee, which became rigid and exclusionary in the years leading up to the 2003 FTAA conference protests. This committee had initially been at the forefront, having developed the MFF concept around the 1980s, which was then revolutionary.
Although there was a 20-year gap between the last related civil riot and the need for tactical developments, this committee became an insular group that resisted change. These post-McDuffie innovators cultivated a sense of cynicism and a lack of attention to new ideas to sustain their legacy (Turgut Karaköse et al., 2023). These soldiers retired because the leadership consistently rejected their suggestions for less-lethal weapons. The absence of a specific trigger that would justify a wholesale overhaul was a primary cause of this holdback.
The committee members who had built MFF from the ground up with their seniority and institutional credibility created a parochial opposition to suggestions from the younger staff ranks. When a Training Bureau sergeant recommended introducing bike units into the game, the senior committee members dismissed it as debris without giving it due attention or an authentic debate. This is evident, for example, in the MDPD’s minimal response to outside community efforts.
Moreover, the hierarchical, paramilitary-dominated structure, with a pronounced top-down decision-making model, of the MDPD impeded the bottom-up flow of ideas (Carvalho et al., 2023). The lack of formal mechanisms to solicit and incentivize innovative ideas from frontline officers prevented even the most daring middle managers from adopting new ideas, for fear of losing their jobs rather than finding the support of leadership. This gap limited the MDPD’s effectiveness in acting on frontline personnel’s mentalities and accumulated knowledge.
Actions to Encourage New Ideas
A dedicated “innovation unit” of constantly rotating junior officers is vital. This unit would be responsible for monitoring and studying global developments. A research group should develop recommendations that do not reinforce the institution’s biases (Carvalho et al., 2023). Removing them from the daily operations gives the creative thought the freedom from operational constraints.
Additionally, institutionalizing inclusive idea-generation processes that involve everyone in the department is vital. One such mechanism could be establishing an online anonymous suggestion box where police officers can submit their ideas and solutions. Leadership can filter these and choose those that are more worthy of investigation with their submitters. This protects junior people from punishment and establishes a direct route for surfacing indigenous inventions.
Moreover, we plan to organize “crowd control hackathons” to encourage collaborative, creative thinking among officers, who will gather regularly to solve situation-based problems arising from actual events like the Buffalo blizzard response. By breaking down hierarchies and allowing different points of view to coexist, we facilitate the emergence of massive ideas. Finally, appropriate incentives are essential to the success of any initiative. Giving rewards such as pay bonuses, certifications, or awards for ideas implemented encourages officers to spend time proposing improvements. Creative thinking must be practically encouraged and valorized as an essential skill.
Steps to Overcome Barriers
Leadership is one of the crucial traits for fostering an environment where questioning the status quo is permitted and encouraged. As an Incident Commander, I got to be an example – bringing consideration to the junior team members, respect for their ideas, and rewarding creativity. If I rudely approach the anti-established-doctrine proposals, my subordinates will adopt the same behavior. Creating a culture of openness where mavericks can share opinions and concerns starts with actively holding me accountable.
Additionally, one should systematically evaluate the department’s shortcomings and mistakes to drive continuous improvement. Having a lessons-learned assessment, honestly, after events like the McDuffie riots, is a better antidote to the hubristic inertia that enabled the committee’s stagnation. We should bring in specialists from other agencies, academic conflict circles, and subjects such as conflict anthropology to combat groupthink (Carvalho et al., 2023). Opening up to outside parties who test our taken-for-granted procedures and ways of thinking can help expose insular blind spots. Consulting the Seattle PD on their experience with the WTO riots helps highlight unnoticed defects.
Conclusion
We will challenge the DRNC’s ability to maintain order amid new threats and the multitude of communities. Adequate preparation involves using employees’ creative and frontline expertise within MDPD at all levels. By studying past wins and losses, we can create an environment that fosters innovation. Anchoring proactive policies that welcome and facilitate ideas will be vital, as they directly address change barriers, which is paramount for creating cutting-edge strategies for a successful DRNC security operation. As an Incident Commander, I am dedicated to creating a culture of innovation, grounded in the excellent tradition of crowd management at MDPD, the leader in the field.
References
Carvalho, L., Paula, A., & Marcello Beckert Zappellini. (2023). Leadership in police work applied to critical contexts: An integrative review and scientific mapping using VOSviewer and Google Trends tools. Security and Defence Quarterly, 22(5), 1-17.
Thieman, F. W. (2020). The disaster of success: Lessons in failed leadership from the criminal justice system. Leader to Leader, 12(9).
Turgut Karaköse, Tijen Tülübaş, & Papadakis, S. (2023). The scientific evolution of social justice leadership in education: structural and longitudinal analysis of the existing knowledge base, 2003–2022. Frontiers in Education, 8(1), 1-18.