Introduction
Twenty-eight nations from North America and Europe have joined forces to form the Organization for the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), which is dedicated to achieving the agreement’s objectives, signed on April 4, 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty’s core concept establishes the organization’s guiding principles and specifies the primary course of action.
The Contracting Parties to this Treaty confirm their commitment to the United Nations Charter’s goals and tenets and wish to coexist peacefully with all peoples and governments in conformity with the Constitution. They are committed to working together to protect one another and uphold security and peace. Territorial disputes pose significant challenges to NATO’s ability to uphold security and peace in the North Atlantic region despite the organization’s commitment to preserving individual freedom, democracy, and the supremacy of law.
Literature Review
To maintain peace and democracy on Earth, NATO’s programs of action cover a variety of life domains and human existence. The NATO committee develops the comprehensive defense program. According to this program, nations and NATO members must defend themselves from any aggression or attempt at attack by a terrorist group or an adversarial government.
Therefore, any aggressive action against one NATO member is regarded as a bold action against all NATO members. As a result, interstate cooperation is primarily influenced by support and fraternity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 28 member countries remain autonomous nations (Wood, 2020). Additionally, every decision made by NATO is founded on extraordinary mutual agreement. That implies that whenever a NATO decision is made public, democratic sovereign states’ aggregate view is expressed.
The primary institutions and methods of NATO set the stage for the regular work of the Alliance, which includes cooperation with partners. The NATO membership expansion has been one of the most crucial movements in international relations after East European politics, American foreign policy, and the Cold War (Rutar, 2019). However, NATO’s top officials have insisted that the Alliance’s growth is a continuous process involving the inclusion of more East European members.
NATO summits are regular occasions for presidents and legislatures of member nations to assess the situation and offer a plan for future activities, allowing them to settle several issues and questions. The proposed subject matter for the summit discussions focused on the organization’s internal operations and expanding collaborations with non-Alliance partners. The NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 was significant for the organization (Boxhoorn and Scott-Smith, 2021). The actual image of effective NATO expansion into Eastern Europe was unveiled during this conference. By unanimous agreement of the Meeting Leaders, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia were admitted as additional members to this union in 2008.
Numerous factors led Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin to invade Ukraine in February and launch Europe’s most significant military confrontation to the Second World War. Putin attempted to frame the position before Moscow invaded Ukraine as a fight between NATO and Russia, but such framing cannot withstand close examination. Putin made an effort. He objected to NATO’s “rising” military threat on Russia’s western frontiers in late 2021 (Wood, 2020). He requested legal protections for Russia as if the nation needed such protections, given that it has the most powerful nuclear weapons in the world and the largest army in all of Europe. Moscow suggested that drafting treaties between NATO and the United States would have prevented even more NATO growth and mandated the Alliance’s complete withdrawal of all military structures from nations that had joined the following 1997.
Washington and NATO suggested collaborating on other drafts of the accords’ risk-reduction and arms-control provisions, which included Russia and might have contributed significantly to the security of Europe. However, representatives from the U.S. and NATO did not rule out additional expansion. Along with fake reports of Kyiv’s neo-Nazis, the Donbas genocide, and Ukraine’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, this became another Putin-highlighted complaint on February 24, justification for his foolish choice to launch a new invasion of Ukraine (Rutar, 2019). Some commentators in the West still support Putin’s claim that NATO is to blame. That claim is not supported by history.
NATO invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to commence membership negotiations in July 1997, but only once did the groundwork become a foundation for a mutually beneficial partnership with Russia. The Establishing Act on Friendly Relations, Partnership, and Security was signed by NATO and Russia. in May 1997, establishing a permanent organization for coordination and consultation (Wood, 2020).
The Founding Act reaffirmed NATO’s “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to station nuclear weapons on the soil of new member states, among other things. The law further declared that NATO does not see “permanent stationing of heavy combat forces” as necessary in the environment of fresh recruits. These announcements represented the Alliance’s efforts to present Moscow with a military force increase that was as non-threatening as possible.
Some detractors attempted to predict the summit’s outcomes before it even began. One of them is shown when Croatia and Macedonia were a component of the former Yugoslavia. This communist nation maintained diplomatic contacts with the West and kept the Soviet Union at a distance. For many years, Albania, another former Cold War communist state, held the title of the most remote nation in Europe. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War, governments committed to democracy and adopting Western institutions (Perry, 2022). The three nations want to enlist in NATO and the European Union. The impoverished countries of Macedonia and Albania have few natural resources.
Although their constant commitment to NATO missions has been praised, the three candidate states do not represent a “strategic” presence in the Alliance regarding their military relevance and available resources. However, the three nations are potentially crucial for southeastern Europe’s stabilization because of the region’s ongoing volatility, further exacerbated by Serbia and Russia’s harshly unfavorable responses to Kosovo’s independence (Boxhoorn and Scott-Smith, 2021). Nevertheless, some sympathizers think including the three candidates in the Alliance would increase stability in southeast Europe, especially in light of Kosovo’s recent independence and significant political factions in Serbia’s ongoing antipathy toward NATO.
The two nations significantly impacted by NATO and yearned for membership were Ukraine and Georgia. Within the Alliance, these two countries have been treated with suspicion and, given the hostilities with Russia, France, Germany, and other NATO partners, rejected invitations to Ukraine and Georgia (Perry, 2022). However, as practice revealed, there seems to be a difference in perception of what happened at the 2008 NATO Governors Summit in Bucharest(Boxhoorn and Scott-Smith, 2021).
There are many causes and justifications for such a reaction. One of the primary arguments in support of NATO expansion is the possibility of gaining free markets and democracy as the pillars of prosperity, international security, and peacebuilding. President Clinton agreed, saying NATO should “Do for Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West: avoid a return to local rivalries, strengthen capitalism against future threats,” and promote prosperity (Boxhoorn and Scott-Smith, 2021, p. 133). However, the inadequate response was brought on by NATO’s expansion.
Discussion
Two weeks before the meeting, demonstrations were held at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and in Bucharest against NATO’s reaffirmed commitment to using nuclear weapons and its backing for the American anti-missile shield. These actions were sparked by concerns that NATO is becoming a global coalition of the willing and that this militarization of international affairs.
Additionally, it aided Russian political groups that opposed the West (Rogov, 2020). This fact hindered Clinton’s administration and his successor from strengthening the democratic elements in Russia’s political system. Russia, in turn, has always been concerned about the security of its territory and the risk that America would endanger the stability of Eastern Europe. No matter if this is an ironic statement made on purpose, only the Baltic states were named as victims of Russian imperialism on a global scale. They have, therefore, always viewed NATO expansion with loyalty.
Although the decision to expand NATO was not military but rather political, Russia adopted a wait-and-see stance toward the proposals and actions of NATO. Putin, however, was the first head of state to reach out to George W. Bush from abroad. Following the attacks of September 11 and the terrorist attacks of 2001, he vowed his nation’s support for the ongoing struggle against terrorism (Perry, 2022).
Following Putin’s statement of support for America, Bush solemnly announced the beginning of a new era in U.S.-Russian relations. The information would be marked by the resurgence of the “strategic partnership” between the two former Cold War adversaries that had existed early in the post-Cold War period (Maddox, 2019). After instantly praising this new relationship assessment, Putin expressed his optimism for a further reconciliation between Moscow and Washington.
Returning to the issue of NATO enlargement, it is essential to note that Russia will no longer be what it was under Yeltsin. Therefore, politicians in the West must adjust to working with a new, powerful, and self-assured state. They should be aware that only Russia, and no one else, has the authority to decide how to design its own political, economic, and social systems. In the interim, they should exert every effort, occasionally even at the expense of their principles and interests, to support Russia’s emergence as a significant player on the world scene. This entails “being clearer about the challenges that NATO is intended to address in the twenty-first century, as well as starting to take seriously Russian proposals for some sort of broader security pact” (Maddox, 2019, p. 162). Additionally, it is crucial for NATO and its member countries to minimize the explosive impacts of the enlargement process on relations with Moscow.
The progress of NATO expansion should not halt merely because Moscow is eager to do so, despite Russia’s relevance and influence in interstate relations being recognized. Former Soviet Union states have complete sovereignty and decision-making capacity (Perry, 2022). They can create the policy direction following their tastes and rational decisions. The relationship between NATO and Ukraine, the second-largest independent nation founded, has been entirely different from that with a former Soviet Union republic. Russia. Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons the Soviet Union had placed on its soil in exchange for financial support from the West and the implied promise of admittance into the international community.
Findings
From 1997 through the beginning of 2014, NATO hardly ever stationed combat troops on its new members’ soil after Russia used That altered in March and April 2014 when Russia used power to acquire. In addition, Crimea became embroiled during the battle in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas (Wood, 2020). Even then, Poland, the three Baltic states, and NATO-sending NATO despatched tripwire forces, multinational battlegroups with 1,000–1,600 men apiece.
Georgia, which chose NATO aid in 1992, is the only nation in the South Caucasus to have been a severe contender for membership in NATO in response to its security issues. Georgia declared its aim to join NATO in 2000, and Shevardnadze formally proposed membership at the November 2002 NATO meeting in Prague. The US-Georgian relationship took on a new, more favorable trajectory following the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (Mayer, 2020). More cash for the Georgian military training deal was offered to Saakashvili when he visited the United States in July 2006.
The leaders of NATO hailed those two nations’ for membership during the 2008 summit. The leaders emphasized Georgia’s and Ukraine’s excellent contributions to the extensive Alliance program operations. They conveyed their views regarding the impending political reforms and constructive improvements in Ukraine and Georgia, which could speed up the Alliance joining process (Mayer, 2020). Additionally, many forms of cooperation encompassing practically all aspects of life and the most pressing issues were agreed upon between NATO and Ukraine.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while the NATO summit showed camaraderie among the attendees, certain irritants in the members’ relationships were exhibited. Regarding Kosovo, Russia declared that it would prevent Kosovo from joining the U.N. Russia has ruled out a restart of the Cold War while taking a firm stance on these topics. According to Mr. Putin, there is no longer an ideological divide between the East and the West, and no significant powers in the world are interested in doing so.
The Alliance’s mission in Afghanistan was settled at the summit’s conclusion. As part of NATO’s largest ongoing military mission in Afghanistan, seven member States and three foreigners promised to provide more soldiers to battle terrorism (Adsiz, 2022). Additionally, the Bucharest summit agreed on how to put together a new Strategic Concept, a crucial document outlining the future course of action for the Alliance, including missions, choices, and military and geographic peacekeeping.
Reference List
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Boxhoorn, B. and Scott-Smith, G. (2021) “North Atlantic Council, bucharest summit declaration, April 3 2008,” The Transatlantic Era (1989–2020) in Documents and Speeches, pp. 133–134. Web.
Maddox, R.J. (2019) “The adversaries,” From War to Cold War, pp. 157–174. Web.
Mayer, S. (2020) “The E.U. and NATO in Georgia: Complementary and overlapping security strategies in a precarious environment,” E.U.–NATO Relations, pp. 133–151. Web.
Perry, B.A. (2022) “Bush, George H. W. (June 12 1924–November 30 2018), forty-first president of the United States,”American National Biography Online [Preprint]. Web.
Rogov, K. (2020) “Political reaction in Russia and ‘party groups’in Russian society,” Russian Social Science Review, 61(1-2), pp. 29–54. Web.
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Wood, A. (2020) “Kremlin winter: Russia and the Second Coming of Vladimir Putin; the return of the Russian Leviathan,”International Affairs, 96(3), pp. 829–831. Web.