Past lessons from war environments need to become powerful guidelines for implementing better and superior tactics. The article “The Leadership Imperative: A Case Study in Mission Command” offers meaningful insights that can support future fighting formations. This discussion relies on this reading to analyze the unit’s proficiency in mission command (MC) as one of the key warfighting functions. The description presents suggestions for continuous improvement for military tactical operations.
Unit’s Proficiency in Mission Command
The proficiency of any military unit will depend on its ability to apply the key functions of warfighting effectively. For instance, the professionals will need to rely on effective leadership, timely sharing and dispersal of information, and movement (Meyer, 2014). Such units will rely on sustainment and intelligence to achieve the intended goals. They will focus on the best strategies to maneuver the environment, stay protected, safeguard the lives of others, and eventually realize the intended objective of defeating the enemy within the stipulated period.
The identified unit is a 2nd Battalion that is engaged in air assault operations in Afghanistan. From the presented case, it is evident that the fighters are forced to move to their command posts (CPs) to get additional guidance and instructions. Their leaders are also unable to execute the best action plans in a timely manner. The “receive mode” process exposes the inefficiency andtactlessnesss of the entire unit since they give the enemy around 12 hours to consolidate and regroup (Meyer, 2014). This outcome reveals that the unit fails to fulfill or meet the major principles of MC in an attempt to defeat the targeted enemy.
The article goes further to indicate that the leaders are less involved since they have to complete various roles as radio operations. They are also forced to rely on the presented guidelines to maneuver and consider their next action plans. The parties are also observed to lack shared obligation and understanding. The members of the unit find it hard to coordinate and learn more about the expanded purpose of the intended operation. The involved commanders fail to take advantage of the situation and prevent the insurgent forces from preparing themselves for a counteroffensive (Meyer, 2014). From these insights and observations, it is agreeable the unit is ill-prepared and incapable of defeating the enemy successfully.
The inability and failure of this battalion unit should become a powerful lesson for future commanders and their soldiers to achieve their goals by following all the principles of MC. For instance, the analysis explains why there is a need for leaders and commanders to have the best intention and communicate it to their followers, accept risks, and provide a shared understanding that is characterized by mutual trust (Meyer, 2014). Such measures have the potential to guide all participants to collaborate, work synergistically, and focus on the best strategies to accomplish the intended mission while minimizing the number of casualties.
Conclusion
The above discussion has revealed that the identified battalion unit was underprepared and incapable of achieving its goals. The operations, tactics, and strategies failed to fulfill the core principles of MC. The unit wasted the available time, thereby allowing the enemy to reorganize and fight back. In conclusion, the outlined suggestions could guide future commanders to reconsider all the warfighting functions and apply the attributes of MC to deliver victory.
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References
Meyer, T. E. (2014). The leadership Imperative: A case study in mission command. Infantry, 26.