Introduction
Russia’s military power is a prominent topic in recent news and contemporary research. Due to the Russian-Ukrainian War, the escalation of the conflict is reviewed and discussed with each new development. One of the points presented in the media and analysis is the different strategy of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) in the conflict against Ukraine, in contrast to its previous military history.
During the first phase of the crisis, Russia’s armed forces conducted large-scale conventional warfare operations against Ukraine, while its VKS remained relatively inactive. This approach was found to be starkly different from those seen in previous conflicts, such as Russia’s activity in Syria, Georgia, and Crimea in 2014 and 2015. Russia’s airpower was vast in those instances, combining drones and aircraft to subdue enemy forces. Thus, it may be possible that the country’s strategy is built on using the air forces to their full potential.
Another potential reason is that Russia’s military forces have changed their strategy, a change that must be examined further. While it was previously believed that Russia has extensive resources that it effectively pours into airpower, the current conflict reveals that the nation’s air force is not fulfilling the expected potential and that reliance on drones cannot be effective in the war against Ukraine.
Current Strategy and Concerns in Ukraine
To investigate the history of Russian airpower, one must analyze its latest conflict and identify the potential hindrances its military strategy has encountered. According to studies on the current war, Russia has been implementing a strategy starkly different from its behavior in previous military operations. The expectations at the beginning of the conflict were for Russia to use its VKS effectively and swiftly to destroy the Ukrainian air forces.
Then, gaining an advantage in the skies, the country could control the war’s progression with support from the ground forces. In reality, the tactics used by the Russian military continue to differ from the anticipated course. In fact, the VKS action was described as ineffective and hesitant, preventing Ukraine from continuing to use its airpower to limit Russia’s presence in the air.
Experts provide several reasons for Russia’s acting differently from its previous military efforts. The first potential problem is the lack of coordination between air and ground forces, which led to either miscommunication or fear of damaging or accidentally shooting their own elements. Another explanation for poor collaboration was the lack of training and depleted resources, which led Russians to choose direct combat over indirect fire. The previous conflicts in Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, and others used much of the country’s airpower and significantly restricted the ability to use drones and airstrikes to the same level.
Furthermore, Russia may be restraining its resources to avoid appearing as an aggressor and further worsening its position globally. This argument aligns with Russia’s media coverage of the conflict as a necessary action to reclaim its territories. Finally, NATO’s influence on Russia’s place in international relations and the risk of being labeled a global enemy could shape the country’s strategy. In contrast to previous conflicts, Russian forces in Ukraine are viewed as invaders by the majority of countries, leading to different interpretations of each element of military activity. Therefore, the media’s presentation of the conflict and other nations’ positions may play a significant role in Russia’s decision to adopt a different, less effective strategy.
Russia’s History of Using Airforce
The Russian government has a long history of using drones to infiltrate enemy territory and attack targets. The Russians have used drones and fighter jets in their operations, with some success and others unsuccessful. One such example is Russia’s attack on Georgia in 2008, where Russian air forces were unable to use VKS to its full potential due to a lack of communication and coordination between ground and air forces. This throughline suggests that Russia’s status as an effective user of airpower is called into question.
Nevertheless, Russia’s use of drones in other conflicts continues to be a challenging argument for why the country has chosen or was forced not to use a more indirect approach. The benefits of drones potentially reveal them to be unfit for this conflict. First, drones can be used as early warning systems or surveillance tools. Second, they can conduct precision strikes from afar. Third, they can be used for reconnaissance missions requiring human pilots aboard or other large aircraft carriers.
Russian drones are also helpful because they allow the country’s military to stay out of harm’s way while still conducting operations against enemy forces. These features of drones were considered beneficial for the country when Russia launched a massive air force campaign in Syria. However, the difference between the two conflicts, as argued by scholars, is the cause of the conflict as broadcast by Russia â the liberation of supporters and territory in Ukraine and suppression in Syria. Using offensive actions deemed necessary in Russia’s previous conflicts is currently considered impossible.
Russia used its airpower in Syria against rebels and ISIS, a case that is viewed in a completely different way, in contrast to Ukraine. In Syria, Russia faced a powerful enemy with extensive air defenses and could exploit weather conditions to launch attacks from multiple directions. In contrast, Ukraine has no air defenses like those in Syria or Russia. They have only light aircraft, such as helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, like fighters and bombers, with no defensive capabilities. Nevertheless, the context of the operations and the extensive prior use of air power have affected Russia’s operational efficiency and limited its air capabilities. Ultimately, the conflict, the lack of collaboration, and the previous use of resources have impacted the country’s current strategy.
Conclusion
The Russian air force and its doctrine rely on offensive operations, whether in cyber warfare, using drones to attack troops, or conducting airstrikes on targets in another country from the safety of Russian territory. This disparity between Russia’s effective use of drones in previous conflicts and Ukraine, and their lack of usage in Crimea, highlights that this model is not as successful in other areas. While the past has shown that air power cannot guarantee a military victory, it can still help support anti-government fighters and set the conditions for future success. Drone airpower could allow Russia to strike targets with little risk, but policymakers and analysts have long considered this option questionable. The Russian-Ukrainian War is different; it involves two nations with distinct agendas and accounts for the influence of global operations on the countries’ military capabilities.
Bibliography
BÄrziĆĆĄ, JÄnis. “The Theory and Practice of New Generation Warfare: The Case of Ukraine and Syria.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 33(3) (2020): 355-380.
Dalsjö, Robert, Jonsson, Michael and Johan Norberg. “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War.” Survival, 64(3) (2020): 7-28.
Fedorchak, Viktoriya. Understanding Contemporary Air Power. New York: Routledge, 2020.
Johnson, Rob. “Dysfunctional Warfare: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine 2022.” Parameters, 52(2) (2022): 5-20.
Krieg, Andreas, and Jean-Marc Rickli. Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2019.
Pynnöniemi, Katri. 2020. “The Russian National Security Strategy: Shaping Perceptions and Coordinating Actions.” Red Diamond 10(4) (2019): 52-54.