Introduction
Every Korean citizen has the freedom to choose their delegates at the federal, provincial, and local levels, as South Korea is a democratic state. The Republic of Korea (ROK), which inherited the PGK’s legitimacy, was formally constituted as a liberal democracy on August 15, 1948. As a result, the democratic system in Korea is well-established. According to the UN, the Republic of Korea is the only sovereign state on the Korean Peninsula (Kotschy & Sunde, 2017).
The government of Park Geun-Hye was sworn in December 2012 with the appointment of the State of Korea’s first female president, bringing a fresh outlook on the populace’s welfare and the country’s advancement. Philosophers contend that the examination of institutional structure and democratic character extends beyond the purely intellectual and philosophical to include considerations that have practical application. This essay examines the influence of institutional architecture on the level of democracy within a nation-state.
A case study approach will be employed, starting with a theoretical overview of the institutional decisions that have already been made and their subsequent effects. The topic will then move on to a thorough assessment of South Korea’s democracy and how its institutional structure affected it. This essay will then discuss its shortcomings, additional elements that might affect how well the institutions perform, and conclusions on the significance of institutional decisions.
Institutional Decision-Making Styles
Electoral Rules
In a democracy, the electoral system establishes the criteria for who can run for office, how they will compete for it, and how they will interact with other candidates or parties, or possibly both (Joppke, 2017). The design and implementation of election procedures, which form the foundation of all democracies, impact the representation of citizens’ demands and desires in the legislature and public policy. Because of this, it can be claimed that selecting election rules is a complex decision whose trade-offs are categorized based on the desired degree of effective governance, accountability, representativeness, and stability.
A majoritarian election system, for instance, would grant representative powers to the majority of voters while disregarding the minority voters, groups, and parties. The electoral systems can be categorized as single-member district majority (SMD-majority), used in France, or mixed-member district plurality (SMD-plurality), used in South Korea. Majoritarianism has the advantage of being easier to administer and simpler.
On the other hand, Duverger’s Law foretells its effects. For instance, society is already stratified and split along various lines. These societal divisions are used by majoritarian electoral systems, particularly SMD-plurality systems, to create political parties. While it is clear that having more parties is a positive thing because it ensures that all groups, including minorities, are represented, it should be highlighted that the majority holds the majority of the power because they can influence legislation and policies. As a result, the democratic system has become less effective.
The proportional electoral system is another type of election where the number of votes is directly proportional to the number of seats. Depending on whether voter choice is permitted, this method is categorized as flexible, open, or closed list. Elections, as was previously said, assist in molding government policies and laws based on the needs and wants of the people. According to Lijphart, democracy benefits from electoral systems that use proportional representation (Joppke, 2017). This claim is supported by the argument that PS systems permit more parties to represent minority groups.
The parties must compromise and cooperate in developing policies as a result of the power being diluted by these parties. Additionally, PR regimes resist collapsing under pressure from internal and external conflicts. But nothing comes without repercussions, and PR voting systems are weak in nations with diverse ethnic populations.
It is because voters will consider the number of candidates who belong to their ethnic groups and are more likely to support them to maintain the dominance of their ethnic group. It effectively undermines and degrades the nation’s democracy, similarly to majoritarian systems (Joppke, 2017). For instance, Tunisia’s PR election system failed because it still experienced the same drawbacks as majoritarian electoral systems despite being diversified and varied. The results would have been worse if SMD had been undertaken, with the Muslim Brotherhood taking 90% of the seats.
Federalism
Federalism is an institutional structure in which a small number of people make decisions about policies and laws. The unity of various divisions or territories, like the US states and South Korean provinces, defines Federalism (Temsumrit, 2021). The quantity of powers each region has and whether those authorities are shared among them are other characteristics of federal administrations. On the other hand, the level of independence and autonomy each state is allowed in policies adopted varies. Federalism, therefore, requires a careful balancing act between the centralization and decentralization of authority. The benefits of Federalism as a system of institutions are clear from this angle.
Federalism, for instance, fosters fierce rivalry in a particular context without turning everything into a zero-sum game. It is accomplished through experimentation and competitive policymaking. Federalism, on the other hand, lessens the tyranny of the majority by decentralizing some of the powers. Because the minority can still find representation even if it means relocating their interests to a region where they are the majority, this boosts the quality of democracy, even though one territory may be advantageous to a particular population. In addition, the main flaw in concentrated (centralized) designs is that the majority is always prioritized.
The local powerhouses can focus their resources on their people and serve the needs of all groups, including the minority, by allowing the territories to make laws and set policies. Since everyone’s wants are addressed, to some extent, this directly translates to a higher quality democratic system (Kotschy & Sunde, 2017). Using the example of Swiss Federalism, the confederation is responsible for taking a long-term view and resolving problems that affect everyone. It entails policing issues like currency and customs, and defending their borders. On the other hand, the states have significant autonomy when formulating policies on social concerns like health and education.
Despite the benefits, Federalism’s institutional design has several drawbacks that jeopardize democracy’s integrity. For instance, various states may adopt incompatible laws. It includes rules that, when viewed differently, weaken the power of free speech or even religion, such as restrictions on the media and free speech.
On the other hand, competition may change course, and regulations, entry hurdles, and even welfare may be lowered to obtain a competitive advantage (Kotschy & Sunde, 2017). It might even go downhill and intensify disparities that would change the distribution of representation or access. For example, a state may reduce taxes on specific companies to entice investment. However, low taxes result in low revenue, which may result in lower financing for social welfare initiatives that grant various minority groups more power.
Legislature
The legislative branch of a government is in charge of enacting the rules that will control how things are done. Due to this, some institutional designs utilize a single assembly (unicameral legislature) to conduct this deliberation and pass laws, while others choose to use two groups (bicameral legislatures). Worldwide, bicameral legislatures are becoming increasingly common. For instance, the Senate and the National Assembly comprise South Korea’s bicameral parliament. Hrvatski Sabor, which consists of 150 seats, is the name of Croatia’s unicameral legislature (Kotschy & Sunde, 2017).
The democratic ramifications of unicameral legislatures are intriguing, but they will not be addressed in this discussion. Instead, the debate will be about the bicameral legislatures’ congruence feature. In contrast to incongruent bicameral legislatures, assemblies in congruent ones have members who share the same political views.
However, the techniques used to choose assembly members and who those members represent directly impact the quality of democracy. According to Taylor, up to 57% of the upper chamber members can be elected. Still, only the members of the lower chamber can be chosen directly by the people (Kotschy & Sunde, 2017). Additionally, the decision can be made by appointment or birth rather than through the democratic process.
Ninety peers are selected for membership in the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, which is a notable example of a bicameral legislature based solely on hereditary status. Equatorial Guinea also has a bicameral parliament, with 55 senators elected and the remaining 15 appointed by the president. Since elections are the foundation of democracy, as was already mentioned, democracies that choose their legislators through elections rather than appointment or other methods are likely to have higher levels of democracy. It should be noted that when the term ‘electoral process’ is used in this context, it refers to elections conducted by an individual, not by other assembly members or even via proxy.
Whom the legislators represent is another factor that affects the caliber of legislation in a bicameral legislature. Most frequently, the lower chamber members represent all residents in a federal organization, such as the US, or a unitary institution, like the Netherlands. In contrast, the upper chamber members represent areas like states (Joppke, 2017). It leads to the hypothesis that incongruence implies malapportionment, which indicates a lesser level of democracy. The claim is supported by the fact that inconsistency might result in situations where neither the population’s size nor diversity is considered when determining legislative representation.
Due to the uneven weighting of the ballots, particular residents are disregarded while the needs of other demographic groups are disproportionately addressed. It implies that democracy has become less effective, thus raising the question of whether bicameralism benefits democracy or improves it. Contrary to the claim made above, bicameralism has another benefit: it establishes checks and balances since, without them, the entire nation or state would be at the whim of a small but influential group. This position now also includes representing territorial interests.
Election Laws
The Senate and the National Assembly are the two chambers of the bicameral parliament of South Korea. The National Assembly and the President are chosen in South Korea in national elections. Every four years, local elections are held to select governors, mayors of metropolitan and municipal areas, and members of provincial and municipal legislatures. For a single, five-year term, the president is chosen directly by most voters.
The National Assembly has 300 members, 253 of whom are elected for a four-year term in single-seat districts and 47 through electoral reform (Cho, 2021). A national party can participate in the legislative general election if its vote in a proportional election exceeds 3% or if more than five members are selected from each of its first-past-the-post election zones. The assembly has been chosen every four years under the Supplementary Member system since the March 1988 electoral law went into effect.
First-past-the-post voting is used to elect certain members, while proportional representation is used to select others at the national level. The seat distribution for “party” legislators under the mixed-member balanced representation system was deemed unlawful by the Constitutional Court in 2001 because it distorted the democratic will (Cho, 2021). A new party’s ability to enter the National Assembly was deemed hampered by the contested electoral system, which was blamed for maintaining the oligopoly of political parties.
As a result, the Court ordered the National Assembly to implement electoral reform and grant every voter two votes, effective from 2004. In 2016, while 47 members were chosen from PR lists, 253 members represented constituencies. Presidential elections are held once every five years, as opposed to the Assembly elections, which frequently result in minority governments and legislative gridlock.
Two factors that never change define Korean politics; the first is the presidency’s concentration of power. The Supreme Prosecutor’s Office and the intelligence bureau can be used politically by the Blue House in addition to being mobilized by a sizable bureaucracy. The powerful presidency cannot be checked by the National Assembly or any of the several independent inspection agencies. Korean presidents frequently undertake institutional reforms that the opposition views as politically biased while wielding significant executive power (Heo, 2017).
In South Korea, the split among the political elite has gotten worse without any indication of composure or moderation. In such a setting, reformist initiatives by a righteous president are frequently perceived as partisan unless preceded by rigorous discussions that consider opposing viewpoints. Punishing court judges for their associations with the prior administration was considered disproportionate, weakening public confidence in the justice system. The same errors of subjecting party politics will be repeated, and the numerous reform efforts will likely fail unless the Korean presidency shifts toward a more inclusive and collaborative government.
The second trait is a party system that is ineffective and unable to satisfy the needs of an increasingly diverse electorate. The two big parties are less responsive to public needs because they are complacent after benefiting from election laws. Per the simple majority rule, which favors the two major parties, 253 constituency seats out of the total 300 seats are elected through the electoral process. Smaller parties, such as the Justice Party and the PP, cannot gain a significant number of assembly seats under this election system.
As a result, breakaway third parties from the two big parties have been incorporated into the latter. The most recent general election, held in April 2020, tested a new rule designed to allocate a higher share of the forty-seven proportional seats to minor parties (Heo, 2017). The two big parties created their satellite parties to maintain their quota of proportional seats despite the change. There are few chances for a substantial third party to emerge due to the veto power of the two big parties.
Future of South Korean Democracy
As a significantly consolidated democracy in Asia, South Korea has just emerged. South Korea was rated as one of the five full democracies in Asia and Australasia in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2020 study. The Korean populace, however, views their domestic politics as being behind their economic and social standards. Through constitutionalism, election integrity, and citizen participation throughout governing system crises, South Korea has demonstrated democratic resilience.
People should have a representative democracy that works well. It is anticipated that the younger generation will pave the way for change. They have a more profound commitment to liberal values, such as individual and minority rights, and are less ideologically constrained (Joppke, 2017). The coming ten years will be crucial for the new democratic age in South Korea.
The electoral laws should be altered so that a majority of Senate seats, rather than all of them being filled by appointment, are filled by elections to address this threat to South Korea’s democracy. Furthermore, the tenure of office for senators should be shortened to 10 years or less. By doing this, the member rotation should be regular enough to give minorities the chance to speak on behalf of their communities.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this case study can be classified as an interpretive type. It is also constrained in that all of the analysis was done in a single direction (discussing how institutional design affects the quality of democracy) when things are far more complicated in real life. Another factor that affects the success of political institutions, for instance, is technology. This has occurred due to the ease with which political institutions can obtain information online to target their audiences and advance their goals at a low cost.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach, which is a crucial lesson to be learned from this case study regarding the significance of institutional choices. Different governments and individuals would favor particular institutional options over others; as a result, a pure comparative analysis would produce meaningless and inaccurate results.
Reference List
Cho, J. (2021) âDemocratization and democracy in South Korea, 1960 â Presentâ, Korea Observer – Institute of Korean Studies, 52(1), pp.131-148.
Heo, I. (2017) âGovernment reorganization in the light of quality of democracy: South Koreaâ, Asian Politics & Policy, 9(2), pp.202-221.
Joppke, C. (2017) âCivic integration in Western Europe: three debatesâ, West European Politics, 40(6), pp.1153-1176.
Kotschy, R. and Sunde, U. (2017) âDemocracy, inequality, and institutional qualityâ, European Economic Review, 91, pp.209-228.
Temsumrit, N. (2021) âDemocracy, institutional quality, and fiscal policy cycle: evidence from developing countriesâ, Applied Economics, 54(1), pp.75-98.