Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia made no secret of its discontent with Ukraine’s independence. Nowadays, no one is surprised that the conquest of Ukraine is, for the political leadership of the Russian Federation and, above all, for Vladimir Putin, a vital factor in restoring the so-called historical Russia. Freedom, dignity, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are integral to the worldview of Ukrainians, who are willing to sacrifice their lives to protect them. These same values are a curse, incompatible with the life of Putin’s regime.
To maintain his power and greatness, Putin has only one option – to destroy Ukraine and thus stop the irreversible development of a free society and a strong economy in his neighborhood. Numerous scholars attribute the desire to recreate the USSR as the primary reason for the invasion, while the economic aspects are often overlooked. Nevertheless, an independent Ukraine’s economic and political success is a death sentence for Russia, whose economy has long been uncompetitive.
Discovering Real Motives Behind the Invasion of Ukraine
The absurd idea of recreating the Soviet Union is very condemnable. For years, the country’s leader has consistently and purposefully promoted the pseudo-historical narrative that Ukrainians and Russians are one people. Thus, restoring the former Soviet Union seems the only way to mitigate the consequences of the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” That is why most experts point out that Russia’s ultimate goal is to rectify the mistakes that led to the collapse of the USSR during the Cold War. However, the meticulous construction of arguments around the Russian leader’s desire to recreate the impossible often overlooks the specific reasons for this desire.
The real reason for Russia’s war against Ukraine is the current Russian government’s awareness of the uncompetitiveness of the economy in the 21st century, amid ideas of global leadership as synonymous with the Russian identity. Russian aggression is primarily a response not to the Maidan in Ukraine in 2013-2014 but to the rallies on Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue in 2011 in the Russian Federation.
Then, the Kremlin faced a choice between reforms and repression within the country. The argument that the difficult economic situation is the root cause of the military conflict differs from the others, above all, because it can link the motives for recreating the USSR, the goal of retaining people’s confidence, and the gradual deterioration of economic indicators.
The country’s leadership’s choice to favor aggression over reforming a dysfunctional system is easier to implement, primarily from the perspective of internal auditing. External pseudo-aggression and territorialization efficiently mobilize already distrustful citizens around the political regime. External audiences are no less important; the world underestimated Putin’s Munich speech in 2007 and the consequences of his relatively loyal response to Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008. In foreign policy, this variant was embodied in a hacking strategy that, wherever possible, fomented conflict worldwide to alter existing rules and the status quo.
Emphasizing the role of the USSR for Putin and making it the primary motive for the outbreak of war leads to omitting the central point. The country’s economic instability is significant because Vladimir Putin himself has repeatedly made it clear that he is not restoring the USSR, but rather intends to surpass it, and has already achieved this goal.
All the claims are based on the fact that the Russian army is strong, not because of Soviet developments but because of its modern weapons, which outstrip their Western analogs. Similarly, Putin’s Russia itself is supposed to be a more solid and modern structure than the USSR and the Romanov Empire, which collapsed. The current war was launched in search of this new, solid, age-old structure and real, sustainable, strong borders.
Thus, the USSR is not Putin’s goal; his true motive is to build the world’s strongest empire, economically and politically superior. It is vital to understand that the Soviet constructs of friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples are being abandoned in the pursuit of new strength. Proclaiming its independence in 1991, Ukraine pursued an independent development path, characterized by democracy, reforms, and European integration. On the other hand, the Kremlin followed a conservative path and an unreasonable desire to restore the empire.
It is critical to note that all that Russia can and is willing to offer to induce independent states to orbit the “Russian world” is military aggression, thousands of deaths, economic disaster, and flouting of international law. As often in its history, and today’s war against Ukraine, Putin’s Russia is persistently but vainly trying to portray itself as a victim of the aggressive West, NATO expansion, or radical Nazis destroying the Russian people. However, these pathetic attempts are meaningless since the entire free world is well acquainted with the Soviet practice of automatic control – substituting notions to cover aggressive ambitions.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the answer to why Russia attacked Ukraine is simple: A country in crisis and instability can never understand and live peacefully next to one that embodies the essence of freedom. At some point, Russia lacked the resources to overcome the economic crisis. Thus, at any moment, there was a risk of potential rallies and widespread dissatisfaction among the masses who were dissatisfied with their standard of living. The Kremlin had an opportunity to build an alliance in the Ukraine-Russia-Europe strategic triangle, but did not take it. Instead, the Russian government relied on war and propaganda, prompting the United States and Europe to adopt a common long-term strategic stance.
Works Cited
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Fried, Daniel and Kurt, Volker. “The Speech In Which Putin Told Us Who He Was.” Politico, 2021.
Gavin, Gabriel. “Putin’s Push for a New USSR Reawakens the Bloody Chaos of Soviet Collapse.” Politico, 2022.
Korelina, Olga. “The Past is a Foreign Country: A Look Back at the Moscow Protests of December 2011 and what’s Become of their Leaders, 10 years Later.” Meduza, 2021.
Warten, Eric. “Putin Slams West, Casts Russia as Victim in State-of-Nation Speech.” France 24, 2023.