Dustin Higgs’ execution was one of several that occurred following the restoration of the capital penalty in the United States. Dustin Higgs was indicted of murdering three women back in 1996. The Supreme Court voted six against 3 to clear Mr. Higgs’ execution amidst dissent by members of the liberal wing (Fuchs, 2021). Mr. Higgs, who maintained his innocence until his death, was indicted for ordering the killing of three women. His lawyers argued that executing him was illogical and biased since the man who did the actual shooting was spared a death sentence. Although Haynes fired the gun, the jurors found that Higgs played a decisive role in the murders.
Justice is necessary for a fair society that acts ethically, meaning we need a justice system to uphold justice and deter criminals. Therefore, meaningful justice must be imposed when people are convicted following complete due process. Meaningful justice, in this case, can be a death sentence, but our society appears more just if it values human life. Our society cherishes justice for the unlawful termination of human life, and the death sentence is the most severe punishment a person may receive from the government. While enforcing the death penalty, we should be conscious of the weaknesses in the judicial system. We do not want to punish by death on those who are truly innocent in the name of proportionality or retaliation. The process preceding Higgs’ execution was marred with controversy following a spree of executions (Fuchs, 2021). In the eyes of the public, the hurried executions signaled ill motives since the death was just reinstated. Justice in a morally upright community is effective because it promotes the good and limits the bad systematically and comprehensively.
In serving justice, the government does not need to kill people on death row to keep everyone safe from them. Acting with the precise intent to cause someone’s death to protect others from his or her aggression appears immoral. When the government metes out vengeance disguised as justice, it becomes complicit with killers in devaluing human life and dignity. In civilized societies, the principle of doing to criminals what they do to others seems misguided. For instance, the penalty for rape cannot be rape but an alternative punishment that befits the offense. In the case of Higgs, he did not commit the crime himself but was held accountable for being a key determining factor in the murder. It raises the moral question of whether a person killing under the instructions of another person should attract lesser punishment than the instructor. Although on certain empirical assumptions, capital punishment may be morally required, a life sentence can equally serve the retributive purpose of a death sentence (Miao, 2020). The deterrent effect of life imprisonment is significant and justifies the infliction of the ultimate penalty of a death sentence. Others have argued that the death sentence honors humans whose lives were taken, but it may not serve its purpose if new evidence exonerates the accused. If new evidence arises exonerating the offender after execution, the death sentence will not have achieved its moral objective or deterrent effect. Therefore, a life sentence should be adopted as an alternative because it carries an equal deterrent effect as the death sentence.
In conclusion, the execution of Higgs justifies the need for a just system in a fair society that acts ethically. However, when we deliberately decide and plan to extinguish human life under the disguise of the law, we commit murder. Imposing meaningful justice, such as a life sentence, can promote good and restrain evil equally. A life sentence may be disproportionate to a death sentence, but it preserves human dignity and values life while imposing the harshest punishment.
References
Fuchs, H. (2021). U.S. executes Dustin Higgs for role in 3 1996 murders. The New York Times. Web.
Miao, M. (2020). Replacing death with life? The rise of LWOP in the context of abolitionist campaigns in the United States. Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy, 15(2), 173-223.