Introduction
This investigation aims to locate Operation Anaconda, which occurred in Afghanistan between March 2 and 18, 2002, per Mission Command Guidelines (United States Department of the Army, 2019). Anaconda’s past is documented in Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Combat (Kugler, 2007). Prioritized areas of inquiry include tactics, project administration, information, and expertise.
Mishandling of the seven operational leadership tenets was displayed during Operation Anaconda. The teams’ efforts to accomplish the mission’s goals were hampered by a lack of clarity on the mission’s purpose and communication. There were variations in understanding the mission’s purpose since the directives were ambiguous and subject to alternative interpretations.
Seven Principles of Mission Command
The employment of proper mission command could have been a key to the success of Operation Anaconda. Its fundamental tenet is to foster trustworthy relationships among team members. It is crucial for productive cooperation and responsible leadership.
The second guiding concept is establishing a common understanding of the objective. Leaders are responsible for ensuring their followers get the big picture, mission objective, and intended outcome. As a result of everyone being on the same page, efficiency increases, and confusion is minimized.
The third tenet of Mission Command is to make the commander’s goals and objectives very apparent. The goals of the mission and the requirements for success are laid forth in the commander’s purpose. As a result, lower-level leaders may make choices consistent with the mission’s overarching objectives and vision.
The fourth principle is to take responsible initiative. Leaders at lower levels need to be given the authority to make decisions and take action within their purview. This enables quick, flexible reactions to shifting conditions, especially in combat, which boosts mission success.
The following of mission orders is the fifth tenet of Mission Command. Mission orders are brief, specific directives that enable subordinates to carry out their duties with little oversight. The sixth tenet is to take calculated risks. Leaders must make educated choices and undertake risky ventures to accomplish the mission’s goals.
Seek and take accountability; this is the last concept of Mission Command. Decisions and actions made by leaders must be taken seriously, with leaders acknowledging that they are ultimately responsible for the mission’s success or failure.
Anaconda Context
In January 2002, intelligence reports from Afghanistan’s Paktika Province indicated that Taliban and Al Qaeda troops were stationed in the Shahikot Valley. The operation to wipe out these forces in January-February was codenamed Anaconda by CENTCOM. Attached are the preexisting CFLCC and CFACC units in Afghanistan. They were both based in the Persian Gulf. CENTCOM’s Coalition Joint Task Force Mountain gave General Hagenbeck the Anaconda (CJTF) task. CJTF was formed by combining elements of the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division. Task Forces Dagger, K-Bar, and Bowie of the Special Operations Forces also reported to him (SOF).
Nevertheless, despite SOF Task Force 11’s deployment to Anaconda, operational control of these anti-ship missiles remained with the CFACC and its subordinate unit in Afghanistan (the Joint Air Operations Center). Soldiers from Afghanistan’s partner CJTF Mountain were present outside of Hagen Beck’s operations to assist. CJTF Mountain consisted of about 600 regular United States forces, 200 Special Operations Forces (SOF), and 400 Afghan troops. The first air support came from various aircraft, including black hawks, chinooks, Apache helicopters, and AC-130 Specter bombers.
Issues of the Operation
Weak progress on the intel acquisition slowed progress on Anaconda. It was established that the Shahikot Valley lacked any opposing force, organization, or weapons via intelligence gathering and clandestine activities. More precise information on civilians in the conflict zone must also be provided.
A topographical analysis suggests that the valley’s nearby hills might provide cover and concealment to the opposing army and open up several shooting lanes over the whole valley. The weather also plagued Anaconda and impeded Russian efforts in the Shahikot Valley. Assaulting forces had difficulty moving due to the challenging terrain, higher heights, and cold fog (Kugler, 2007).
The Allies’ attack plan included a hammer-and-anvil approach that lasted 72 hours. The CJTF Mountain in the area was cut in half when Togo entered the region. Around 400 troops were sent to watch the seven containment zones (the anvil). The Afghan military, aided by special operations forces (SOF), successfully drove the enemy forces out of the valley and into the blocking army (the 4Hammer).
There were communication issues right from the start. The Air Force sent 30 highly trained air commanders to artillery groups. However, these commanders were not equipped with optical IDs, making it impossible to target them using GPS. Misunderstandings in ground-to-air communication occurred when Special Operations Forces (SOF) communications for Combat Air Support (CAS) fought with requests for airstrikes from regular ground troops.
The rugged slopes and tunnels in the area made many airstrikes useless. On day three, it became apparent that CJTF Mountain was more proficient than CFACC and CAOC in spotting, evaluating, and selecting targets (Kugler, 2007). With more consistent and effective airstrikes, CJTF Mountain was able to seize the upper hand in the war.
However, CAS was responsible for the most significant losses among the enemy troops. There was an over-reliance on CAS since ground forces needed to be improved. Armed ground troops are essential, especially for dispersed operations (Kugler, 2007).
The CENTCOM pattern is poorly organized regarding its integrated approach; the CJTF is in charge of the air support and Reaction Team 11 from a tactical standpoint. Due to their dispersed leadership structure and limited command and control over crucial resources, poor mission management also revealed a lack of cohesion and mutual understanding among CJTF Mountains’ members.
However, the lack of information and background clouded the commander’s true motives. As a result of not increasing information capabilities to compensate for intel shortfalls, there are no spaces in the monitoring that should not exist. The CJTF lacked the personnel to maintain seven blockade positions in the face of unknown enemy deployments and force strengths. This goes against the practice of prudent risk-taking.
This was an obvious incidence of disobeying mission instructions and an indicator of a decline in unity and trust between the Afghan and American soldiers. U.S. ground soldiers and air forces did not engage in the sort of close, careful teamwork and collaborative planning generally necessary to accomplish a big CAS mission until D-Day because of the battle plan’s ground-oriented emphasis (Kugler, 2007).
An incapacity to generate shared knowledge and build trusted connections is evident in this circumstance. The CAS’s standing may have improved due to its commitment to rigor. An incident in which a C-130 aircraft accidentally fired on Afghan and SOF forces exemplifies the lack of understanding between the two groups.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Operation Anaconda was a joint mission by the United States and Afghan forces to eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan. Poor communication and a lack of clarity on the mission’s purpose hindered the teams’ efforts to accomplish the mission’s goals.
The seven elements of mission command were not followed, resulting in a lack of trust and unity between the teams. The lack of proper information and resources and a misunderstanding of mission instructions all contributed to the mission’s failure. If proper mission planning, communication, and understanding of mission objectives had been established, the mission may have been successful.
References
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. National Defense University Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy.
United States Department of the Army. (2019). ADP 6-0 mission command: Command and control of army forces. Web.